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INTRODUCTION 
Is a defendant entitled to a new trial when his counsel has repeatedly 
spouted ugly racial stereotypes and used racial epithets in referring to his 
clients? Or should a reviewing court require the defendant to show how he 
was “prejudiced” by that lawyer’s racial antagonism? In June of 2018, Ellis 
v. Harrison held that unless defense counsel had expressed his racist views 
to the defendant himself, no conflict will be presumed.1 The defendant must 
show both deficient performance and prejudice to establish a Sixth 
Amendment violation. In January of 2019, the Ninth Circuit granted 
rehearing en banc.  
At first, this may look like just another case where a liberal circuit grants 
en banc review of a conservative panel’s decision. But the Ellis panel was 
not conservative: all three judges were Democratic appointees. And 
accompanying the per curiam opinion was a remarkable concurrence—
signed by all three judges—that began by virtually begging for an en banc 
review and reversal:  
If we were writing on a blank slate, I would vote to grant relief. Of 
the constitutional rights given to a criminal defendant, none is more 
important than the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. By allowing 
Ellis’s conviction to stand, we make a mockery of that right.2 
 
1. 891 F.3d 1160, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).  












Moreover, in the course of her concurrence, Judge Nguyen described and 
deplored the comments made by defense counsel, distinguished counsel’s 
attitudes from run-of-the-mill racism, referred to the race of the panel 
members and advocates in the case, and observed that the increasing 
diversity in the legal profession had failed to eradicate racial bias. She ended 
by stating that circuit precedent tied her hands, requiring denial of relief.3 
Will en banc review provide a simple answer? No. The oral argument 
makes clear that the Ninth Circuit, though sympathetic to the merits of the 
claim, is troubled by a host of procedural issues.4 But even were those 
obstacles to be overcome, grant of certiorari following a liberal criminal 
procedure decision, particularly from the Ninth Circuit, would not be 
unexpected. And then, even if the Supreme Court were willing to view the 
case more generously than most criminal procedure claims because it 
involves race—which four recent cases5 suggest it might—a swamp of 
lawyer misconduct beyond racial antagonism lies ahead. Any decision by 
the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court will likely implicate misconduct in 
forms other than racial antagonism. 
What should happen if a lawyer sleeps during parts of the trial—or is 
sleeping with the prosecutor? If defense counsel was mentally ill or 
intoxicated during the trial, should a court measure her performance by the 
deferential standards that apply to most ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims? Or should that court, after ascertaining those facts, simply grant the 
defendant a new trial? What about defendants represented by lawyers who 
aim to profit by securing media rights to their client’s case? Or defendants 
represented by lawyers seeking employment with the district attorney’s 
office? 
No one doubts that lawyers should refrain from the use of racial slurs, 
from sleeping during trial, from “sleeping with the enemy,” from 
 
3. Id. at 1166–67. 
4. The procedural history of the case is something of a circus. Upon the grant of en banc review, 
the State changed its position, and conceded that the writ of habeas corpus should be granted. The Ninth 
Circuit then appointed Kent Scheidigger to argue that the original decision was correct. The San 
Bernadino District Attorney’s Office then filed an amicus brief in support of Scheidigger’s brief. 
Moreover, there are issues related to the failure to exhaust state court rememdies. Oral Argument at 
21:39, Ellis v. Harrison, 891 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-56188), https://www.ca9.uscou 
rts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000015908. 
5. Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. __ (2019) (trial court at defendant's sixth trial for capital 
murder clearly erred in concluding that State’s peremptory strike of black prospective juror was not 
racially motivated); Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (holding that, when a juror 
clearly states that he relied on race to convict the defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires the trial court 
to consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee); 
Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (finding counsel ineffective for introducing otherwise favorable 
testimony that included statement that defendant was more likely to be violent because he was black); 
Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016) (finding prosecutor discriminated on the basis of race in 
striking two black jurors). 












representing clients while mentally ill, from intoxication in the courtroom, 
or from securing illicit gains through the travails of their clients. Such 
prohibitions are generally imposed by rules of professional ethics, but those 
rules do not address the consequences for the criminal defendant whose 
lawyer ignored them. Cases raising these and similar questions are rife in 
the lower courts. 
To date, the Supreme Court has not considered the appropriate remedies 
for any of these transgressions. Its precedents do, however, establish three 
categories of counsel failure, each with a different standard for judging 
whether the failure harmed the defendant enough to demand a new trial: the 
truant, the torn, and the terrible. Under claims governed by United States v. 
Cronic, a defendant who proves that his lawyer was “truant,” that is, absent 
or constructively absent, need show no more.6 This is the most defendant-
friendly, but least common, category. A slightly larger category, defendants 
with “torn” lawyers, must, pursuant to Cuyler v. Sullivan, show the 
existence of a conflict of interest, and show that the existing conflict 
“adversely affected” the lawyer’s performance.7 But by far the largest 
category of counsel failure claims, those involving present, presumptively 
loyal, but just plain terrible lawyers, are governed by the harsh standard of 
Strickland v. Washington, which requires proof that trial counsel was 
incompetent, and proof of “prejudice”—a “reasonable likelihood” that 
competent representation would have resulted in a different verdict.8  
Years after the verdict, the difficulty in assessing that likelihood 
combined with the judicial drive toward finality means that many lower 
courts refuse to find prejudice under Strickland even in the face of grave 
malfeasance by counsel. Consequently, determining into which category a 
particular form of counsel failure falls—and therefore whether any proof of 
prejudice is required—is often outcome-determinative. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court has provided only a few examples of these categories, 
eschewing both catalogues and theories. Not surprisingly, lower courts have 
responded in ways that seem arbitrary.  
Calvin Burdine’s case provides a striking example of arbitrary 
determination of a Cronic claim of constructive absence. The Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals9 and a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals10 
were excoriated for ruling that even when a capital defendant’s lawyer slept 
 
6. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
7. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
8. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
9. Ex parte Burdine, 901 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), vacated sub nom. Burdine v. 
Johnson, 231 F.3d 950 (2000). 













through significant portions of his trial, a new trial was not automatic, but 
required the defendant to shoulder the burden of proving that he was 
prejudiced by those naps. Public response to this ruling was very critical; 
put in layperson’s terms, it was astonishing to learn that, if charged with a 
crime, a person would be entitled to a lawyer, but not necessarily one who 
was awake. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc was therefore 
applauded for concluding that a sleeping lawyer was tantamount to no 
lawyer at all, and mandated reversal.11 What did not reach the public or the 
press, however, was the Fifth Circuit’s insistence that drunk lawyers and 
mentally ill lawyers were horses of a different color, and consequently, that 
the demonstration of a lawyer’s intoxication or paranoia would not suffice 
for reversal.12 A layperson might have thought the right to a lawyer implied 
a sane and sober lawyer, as well as one able to stay awake.  
The Supreme Court’s response to Burdine only deepens the apparent 
arbitrariness of the constructive absence category. The Court held the 
petition for certiorari in Burdine pending its determination of Bell v. Cone,13 
another case in which the lower court had determined that the Cronic 
constructive absence standard applied. The Supreme Court reversed the 
lower court in Cone, explaining that defense counsel’s failure to oppose the 
prosecution at specific points—rather than throughout the sentencing 
proceeding—made the case one governed by Strickland (where prejudice 
must be proved), and not by Cronic (where prejudice would be presumed).14 
This would seem to imply that falling asleep only during portions of a trial 
should be governed by Strickland and not by Cronic—which would mean 
that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Burdine was wrong. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Burdine.  
Another case from the Fifth Circuit, that of Betty Lou Beets,15 makes 
clear that the application of the category of conflicted lawyers is as arbitrary 
as the application of the constructively absent lawyers category. Beets was 
charged with the murder of her husband for pecuniary gain, and part of the 
State’s proof of motive was evidence that she sought to obtain insurance 
benefits for her husband’s death.16 Her lawyer, however, could have 
 
11. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Cockrell v. Burdine, 
535 U.S. 1120 (2002); see also, e.g., Editorial, Slumber and Death in Texas, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 
2001; Rulings Show Texas’ Justice System Flawed, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 17, 2001; 
Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, Let Sleeping Lawyers Plea, CBSNEWS (Mar. 7, 2002, 2:08 PM), https://www. 
cbsnews.com/n ews/let-sleeping-lawyers-plea/ [https://perma.cc/Z9VF-4ZWS]. 
12. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Cockrell v. 
Burdine, 535 U.S. 1120 (2002).  
13. 535 U.S. 685 (2002). 
14. Id. at 697–98. 
15. Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Beets v. 
Johnson, 517 U.S. 1157 (1996). 
16. Id. at 1262.  












testified that he himself had informed Beets of such benefits after her 
husband’s disappearance, and her subsequent interest or inquiry into 
benefits was attributable to this post-crime information.17 But a lawyer 
cannot be both an advocate and a witness, and Beets’s lawyer did not 
withdraw. Why not? Probably because he had a formal contract with Beets 
that exchanged his legal services for the media rights to her story, rights that 
would vest when she was executed.18 The district court found that this 
contract created a conflict and granted relief.19  
Although the Fifth Circuit agreed that Beets would prevail were Cuyler 
applicable, and also castigated the lawyer’s decision to enter into the 
contract as a breach of his ethical obligations, it reversed the grant of relief.20 
It reasoned that Strickland rather than Cuyler should be applied, because, 
unlike in multiple representation cases where the lawyer may be 
“immobilized by conflicting ethical duties among clients, a lawyer who 
represents only one client is obliged to advance the client's best interest 
despite his own interest or desires.”21 Thus, because a lawyer should place 
his client’s interests above his own, the Fifth Circuit presumed that the 
lawyer in fact did so—despite the fact that this same lawyer should not have 
entered into a situation that placed his client’s interests in opposition to his 
own, but nevertheless did so. Beets has become the leading case in the Fifth 
Circuit on the question of what constitutes a conflict sufficient to trigger the 
Cuyler standard;22 that position was bolstered by the Supreme Court’s 
passing reference to Beets in Mickens v. Taylor,23 its own most recent case 
applying—but declining to define—Cuyler’s boundaries. 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court decided Cronic thirty-five years 
ago, and Cuyler almost forty, lower court opinions reflect widespread 
disagreement on the kinds of lawyer failure each encompasses.24 Mickens 
has done nothing to alleviate the confusion about conflict cases, and Cone 
has set the rule for only a small subset of the Cronic cases.25 This article 
 
17. Id. at 1263–64.  
18. Id. at 1261–62.  
19. Id. at 1261.  
20. Id. at 1279.  
21. Id. at 1271. 
22. See Brent Coverdale, Comment, Cuyler Versus Strickland: The Proper Standard for Self-
Interested Conflicts of Interest, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 209 (1998); see also Alexandra N. DeNeve, Recent 
Development, Beets v. Scott: The Fifth Circuit Adopts the Strickland Test to Deal with Ineffective 
Assistance Claims that Arise from Conflicts of Interest that Do Not Involve Multiple- or Serial-Client 
Representation, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1689 (1996). 
23. 535 U.S. 162, 174 (2002). 
24. See Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515 (2009); 
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic’s Call to 
Presume Prejudice from Representational Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 827 (2003). 












aims to rethink the categories of counsel failure; no article to date does so. 
Perhaps Ellis v. Harrison will provide the motivation to sort out the forms 
of counsel failure, and perhaps this article might provide help in doing so. 
Part I will first summarize the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel jurisprudence, paying particular attention to the Court’s 
descriptions of the purpose of the right and its comments regarding the three 
counsel failure categories. Part II then samples lower court attempts to place 
species of counsel failure into the three categories. Part III will consider 
what the rationale behind Cronic suggests about the criteria by which courts 
should separate out the constructively absent lawyer from the merely bad 
one, and then apply the resulting insight to racially antagonistic, sleeping, 
intoxicated and mentally ill lawyers. Part IV does the same thing for 
conflicted lawyers, proposing a touchstone for identifying Cuyler cases, and 
applying it to two other identifiable groups of conflicted loyalties: extreme 
psychological barriers to loyalty, such as animosity, and large personal 
opportunity costs, such as extraordinary countervailing financial or 
romantic incentives.  
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING COUNSEL FAILURES 
A quick tour of the development of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is a necessary predicate to understanding the values the right 
protects, which I will argue has implications for where the lines should be 
drawn between Cronic, Cuyler, and Strickland claims. 
A. The Right to Appointed Counsel 
The last clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”26 In 1932, 
Powell v. Alabama27 held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment both incorporates that right against the states and requires the 
State to provide counsel for indigent defendants facing capital charges.28 
 
Casenote, “What We Meant Was . . .” The Supreme Court Clarifies Two Ineffective Assistance Cases in  
Bell v. Cone, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1271 (2003) (criticizing Cone); Hadassah Reimer, Case Note, Legal 
Ethics—Stabbed in the Back, but No Adverse Effect, Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002), 3 WYO. 
L. REV. 329 (2003) (criticizing Mickens). 
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 3. 
27. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
28. Id. at 71.  












Thirty years later Gideon v. Wainwright29 recognized the applicability of 
this reasoning to non-capital felonies.30 Citing language from Powell, it 
described the importance of a lawyer: 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes 
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, 
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good 
or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the 
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and 
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the 
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a 
perfect one.31 
B. Counsel Failure 
Gideon involved a total denial of counsel, and therefore said nothing 
about the quality of the assistance of counsel required by the Sixth 
Amendment. It did, however, establish that total denial of counsel requires 
reversal of a defendant’s conviction, and, by its silence, implied that inquiry 
into the consequences of that denial is inappropriate.32 
Powell, in contrast, did not involve a total denial of the right to counsel, 
but the Supreme Court treated the last-minute appointment of counsel in 
Powell as the equivalent of total denial, and did not consider how the 
defendants were prejudiced by the tardiness of the appointment.33 Powell 
therefore suggested that the right to counsel was more than the right to have 
a member of the bar sit next to the defendant at trial, but gave little further 
guidance. 
Shortly after Powell, the Supreme Court decided Glasser v. United 
States,34 adding another clue as to what the right to counsel entailed. Glasser 
reversed a conviction where, over objection, an attorney was required to 
represent two codefendants whose interests were in conflict.35 Glasser 
abjured inquiry into “the precise degree of prejudice sustained,” because the 
 
29. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
30. Gideon did not specifically describe the crimes to which the right to appointed counsel 
applies, but in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court held that no person may be 
imprisoned for a crime without being offered the assistance of counsel. 
31. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69). 
32. Id. 
33. Powell, 287 U.S at 71 (the duty to provide indigent capital defendants with counsel “is not 
discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of 
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case”). 
34. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). 












Court deemed such inquiry both difficult and unnecessary, reasoning that 
“[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute 
to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice 
arising from its denial.”36 
It took another forty years for the Supreme Court to return to the question 
of what standards should govern counsel failure. In the meantime, the Court 
considered a number of issues tied to prosecutorial or judicial interference 
with the right to counsel, such as the nature of Sixth Amendment rights in 
interrogation37 and identification38 proceedings, and the permissibility of 
denying counsel the right to examine his client under oath39 or to argue facts 
in summation.40 Then, in quick succession, the Court decided Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, Cronic v. United States, and Strickland v. Washington, and in those 
three cases laid out the categories of counsel failure and the standards for 
assessing each category. I begin with the most permissive—but, as it turns 
out, numerically tiny—category. 
1. Truant Lawyers 
The most defendant-friendly category of cases, like Powell and Gideon, 
requires automatic reversal without any additional showing; neither 
deficient performance nor prejudice is required. The Supreme Court’s 
comments concerning that category of cases, however, have been as brief 
as the category is (apparently) small. Such claims are commonly referred to 
as “Cronic” claims, despite the fact that Cronic v. United States41 decided 
that the claim made in that case was not a Cronic claim, or at least not a 
successful Cronic claim.42 
a. Cronic v. United States 
Cronic was decided on the same day as Strickland, and was remanded 
for a determination of the merits under ordinary Strickland standards. The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed Cronic’s conviction as a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment.43 It had not, however, considered 
whether trial counsel had made specific errors or what effect any errors 
might have had on the outcome. Instead, it had reasoned that no showing of 
 
36. Id. at 75–76. 
37. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).  
38. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
39. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972). 
40. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). 
41. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
42. Id. at 666.  
43. United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 446 U.S. 648 (1984).  












deficient performance or prejudice was necessary “when circumstances 
hamper a given lawyer’s preparation of a defendant’s case.”44 The lower 
court’s inference that counsel had been unable to discharge his duties was 
based upon the consideration of five circumstances: 1) the time afforded for 
investigation and preparation; 2) the inexperience of counsel; 3) the gravity 
of the charge; 4) the complexity of possible defenses; and 5) the 
inaccessibility of witnesses.45 
The Supreme Court rejected both this approach and the circuit court’s 
conclusions, “begin[ning] by recognizing that the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the 
effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.”46 The Court 
next noted, “[B]ecause we presume that the lawyer is competent to provide 
the guiding hand that the defendant needs, the burden rests on the accused 
to demonstrate a constitutional violation.”47 However, it acknowledged that 
some circumstances are “so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of 
litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”48 
So far, so good, the author of the lower court opinion might have thought, 
but then came the list of what those cases are. Not surprisingly, the Supreme 
Court deemed “complete denial of counsel” the most obvious —explaining 
that “[t]he presumption that counsel’s assistance [at trial] is essential 
requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the [defendant] is denied 
counsel at a critical stage of his trial.”49 Second, where counsel has “entirely 
fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, 
then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the 
adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.”50 Third, citing Powell v. 
Alabama, the Court stated:  
Circumstances of that magnitude may be present on some occasions 
when although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, 
the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could 
provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of 




45. Id. at 1129. 
46. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. 
47. Id. (citation omitted). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 659. 
50. Id. 












The opinion then considers the five factors cited by the Court of Appeals, 
and concludes that whether viewed separately or in combination, they did 
not provide a basis for concluding that competent counsel would not have 
been able to provide a defendant with “the guiding hand that the 
Constitution guarantees.”52 According to the Court, neither the period of 
time the Government spent investigating the case, nor the number of 
documents that its agents reviewed during that investigation determined 
whether a competent lawyer could prepare the case in twenty-five days. The 
Court also held that none of the other factors Cronic had relied upon—the 
lawyer’s youth, his lack of any jury trial experience, and his lack of expertise 
in criminal law—even viewed together, did not justify a presumption of 
ineffectiveness.53 Finally, although the seriousness of the charge, the 
complexity of the case, and the accessibility of witnesses “are all matters 
that may affect what a reasonably competent attorney could be expected to 
have done under the circumstances, . . . none identifies circumstances that 
in themselves make it unlikely that respondent received the effective 
assistance of counsel.”54 
Thus, after Cronic it seemed unlikely that a short preparation period 
(unless as short as that in Powell), counsel’s inexperience or lack of 
expertise, the nature of the case, or barriers to investigation could trigger 
automatic reversal. But Cronic, by virtue of its listing of “complete denial 
of counsel,” “failure to subject the prosecution’s case to adversarial testing,” 
and “circumstances of that magnitude” fostered hopes—and habeas 
petitions asserting—that there were other cases to which the automatic 
reversal rule should apply. Since Cronic, the Supreme Court has offered 
lower courts only one small source of guidance on what any of these phrases 
mean—Bell v. Cone.55 
b. Bell v. Cone  
Cone, like Cronic, turned out not to be a Cronic case after all. The Sixth 
Circuit had concluded that Cronic should have governed Cone’s claim that 
his counsel’s failure to present any mitigating evidence or make a closing 
argument at his capital sentencing proceeding constituted a violation of 
Cone’s right to counsel.56 In reversing, the majority first affirmed that 
Cronic had “identified three situations . . . ‘so likely to prejudice the accused 
that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified,’”57 
 
52. Id. at 663. 
53. Id. at 665.  
54. Id. at 666. 
55. 535 U.S. 685 (2002). 
56. Id. at 693. 
57. Id. at 695 (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658–59). 












but then disagreed with the lower court’s determination that counsel’s 
failure to “mount some case for life” fell within the second exception 
identified in Cronic: 
When we spoke in Cronic of the possibility of presuming prejudice 
based on an attorney’s failure to test the prosecutor’s case, we 
indicated that the attorney’s failure must be complete. We said “if 
counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful 
adversarial testing.” Cronic, [466 U.S.] at 659 (emphasis added). 
Here, [Cone’s] argument is not that his counsel failed to oppose the 
prosecution throughout the sentencing proceeding as a whole, but 
that his counsel failed to do so at specific points. For purposes of 
distinguishing between the rule of Strickland and that of Cronic, this 
difference is not of degree but of kind.  
 The aspects of counsel’s performance challenged by [Cone]–the 
failure to adduce mitigating evidence and the waiver of closing 
argument–are plainly of the same ilk as other specific attorney errors 
we have held subject to Strickland’s performance and prejudice 
components.58  
Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter. Much of his dissent is a lengthy 
description of the sentencing phase, after which Stevens concludes: 
 On these facts, and as a result of [trial counsel’s] overwhelming 
failure at the penalty phase, the Court of Appeals properly concluded 
that Cronic controls the Sixth Amendment claim in this case . . . . 
[Counsel’s] decisions to present no mitigation case in the penalty 
phase, and to offer no closing argument in the face of the 
prosecution’s request for death, are nothing short of incredible. 
Moreover, [counsel’s] explanations for his decisions were not only 
uncorroborated, but were, in my judgment, patently unsatisfactory.59 
To the majority’s assertion that Cone’s complaints could be framed as 
objections to what counsel failed to do “at specific points,” Stevens 
responded that “when those complaints concern ‘points’ that encompass all 
of counsel’s fundamental duties at a capital sentencing proceeding—
performing a mitigation investigation, putting on available mitigation 
evidence, and making a plea for the defendant’s life after the State has asked 
for death—counsel has failed ‘entirely.’”60 
 
58. Id. at 696–98 (footnote omitted). 
59. Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 












Another issue lurking in Cone, but not fully faced, was the question of 
whether the mental illness of counsel should be treated as a Cronic 
violation. Justice Stevens noted while the state court did not have 
information concerning counsel’s mental illness, in fact he suffered a severe 
mental impairment and committed suicide six months after the 
postconviction hearing.61 The onset of his mental illness was not certain, but 
Justice Stevens interpreted his extraordinary fear of what the prosecution 
would do as likely attributable to his paranoia, and Stevens commented that 
the timidity displayed by counsel was not consistent with the adversarial 
testing required by the Sixth Amendment.62 The majority expressed doubt 
that counsel was in fact ill at the time of trial.63 The Court further found that, 
because no evidence of mental illness had been presented to the state court, 
federal courts could not consider such evidence in reviewing the state court 
judgment.64 It did not, however, express any view as to the significance of 
mental illness in Cronic claims in cases where evidence of that illness was 
properly before a court.65 
2. Torn Lawyers 
The conflict cases are intermediate, both with respect to the stringency 
of what they require a defendant to establish, and with respect to their 
numbers. Cuyler v. Sullivan,66 decided in 1980, was the first Supreme Court 
case to address a conflict of interest for which the lawyer bore responsibility. 
But prior to Cuyler, the Court had twice faced the issue of the proper remedy 
for a defendant whose lawyer was forced—over his objection—to represent 
conflicting interests, and these cases laid much of the groundwork for 
Cuyler.  
a. Holloway v. Arkansas 
Glasser v. United States,67 as noted earlier, held that when a judge 
compelled joint representation of codefendants whose interests were in 
conflict, reversal was mandated because the right to counsel “is too 
fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as 
to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.”68 Holloway v. 
 
61. Id. at 715–16. 
62. Id. at 716. 
63. Id. at 697 n.4 (majority opinion). 
64. Id. 
65. See id. 
66. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
67. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). 
68. Id. at 75–76. 












Arkansas,69 a second case of joint representation over objection, affirmed 
the propriety of automatic reversal in such cases, and offered further defense 
for that remedy. First it described the harm flowing from the representation 
of conflicting interests, drawing out the parallels to total denial of counsel: 
 That an attorney representing multiple defendants with conflicting 
interests is physically present at pretrial proceedings, during trial, and 
at sentencing does not warrant departure from [the automatic reversal 
rule of Gideon]. Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect 
because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing. . . . 
Generally speaking, a conflict may also prevent an attorney from 
challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but 
perhaps favorable to another, or from arguing at the sentencing 
hearing the relative involvement and culpability of his clients in order 
to minimize the culpability of one by emphasizing that of another.70 
Holloway then turned to the practical reason for an automatic reversal 
rule, the difficulty of assessing the damage flowing from joint 
representation of conflicting interests: 
[A] rule requiring a defendant to show that a conflict of interests . . . 
prejudiced him in some specific fashion would not be susceptible of 
intelligent, evenhanded application. In the normal case where a 
harmless-error rule is applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope is 
readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court can undertake 
with some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the 
likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the 
jury. . . . But in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests 
the evil–it bears repeating–is in what the advocate finds himself 
compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to 
possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. . . . 
Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, 
unlike most cases, unguided speculation.71 
b. Cuyler v. Sullivan 
The Third Circuit extended Holloway’s reasoning to a case where 
counsel had not objected to joint representation, but the defendant asserted 
in postconviction proceedings that his lawyers had represented conflicting 
 
69. 435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
70. Id. at 489–90. 












interests; it held that a criminal defendant is entitled to reversal whenever 
he makes “some showing of a possible conflict of interest or prejudice, 
however remote.”72 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated, 
explaining why the Third Circuit erred in applying Hlloway’s reasoning to 
Cuyler:  
Defense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting 
representations and to advise the court promptly when a conflict of 
interest arises during the course of trial. Absent special 
circumstances, therefore, trial courts may assume either that multiple 
representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients 
knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist. . . . Unless the 
trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict 
exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry.73 
Concomitantly, “unless the trial court fails to afford [the opportunity to 
show that potential conflicts imperil his right to a fair trial], a reviewing 
court cannot presume that the possibility for conflict has resulted in 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”74 
Instead, reversal in a conflict of interest case where no timely objection 
was raised requires that a defendant “establish that an actual conflict of 
interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.”75 A defendant who 
makes such a showing, however—unlike a defendant complaining about the 
adequacy of unconflicted counsel’s performance—“need not demonstrate 
prejudice in order to obtain relief.”76 
The Cuyler court gave no instruction into the meaning of “an actual 
conflict of interest adversely affect[ing] his lawyer’s performance.” Justice 
Marshall dissented in part, asserting that because “[a]n actual conflict of 
interests negates the unimpaired loyalty a defendant is constitutionally 
entitled to expect and receive from his attorney,”77 a showing of such a 
conflict should suffice for reversal. The majority did not explain exactly 
what the modifying phrase “adversely affect[ing] his lawyer’s performance” 
meant, but Justice Marshall objected that “[i]f the Court’s holding would 
require a defendant to demonstrate that his attorney’s trial performance 
differed from what it would have been if the defendant had been the 
 
72. United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 519 (1979) (quoting Walker v. United 
States, 422 F.2d 374, 375 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam)), vacated, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
73. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346–47 (1980) (footnotes omitted). 
74. Id. at 348. 
75. Id. at 350. 
76. Id. at 349–50. 
77. Id. at 356 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 












attorney’s only client . . . it is inconsistent with [the Court’s] previous 
cases[,] . . . unduly harsh, [and] incurably speculative as well.”78  
Justice Brennan would have split the difference, requiring no showing of 
prejudice or effect in cases where the trial court had not advised the 
defendant of the risks of joint representation, but “[w]here it is clear that a 
defendant has voluntarily chosen to proceed with joint representation, it is 
fair, if he later alleges ineffective assistance [of counsel] growing out of a 
conflict, to require that he demonstrate ‘that a conflict of interest actually 
affected the adequacy of his representation.’” 79 
For twenty years, the lower courts struggled—without Supreme Court 
elaboration—to apply the Cuyler standard.80 Wood v. Georgia’s81 cryptic 
remand “to determine whether the conflict of interest that this record 
strongly suggests actually existed82 further complicated matters. Its wording 
suggested that perhaps the Court was adopting Justice Brennan’s 
distinction, and would not, in cases where the trial court had made no 
inquiry, require a showing that the conflict “adversely affected his lawyer’s 
performance.”  
c. Mickens v. Taylor 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mickens v. Taylor83 to resolve 
“what a defendant must show in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment 
violation where the trial court fails to inquire into a potential conflict of 
interest about which it knew or reasonably should have known.”84 Mickens 
buried Justice Brennan’s distinction, deeming the “actual conflict” wording 
of Wood merely shorthand for “a conflict that affected counsel’s 
performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.”85 
Consequently, it held that regardless of whether a trial court should have 
conducted an inquiry into a possible conflict, unless counsel had protested 
joint representation, Sixth Amendment claims concerning conflicted 
 
78. Id. at 355. 
79. Id. at 353 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). 
80. See Coverdale, supra note 22, at 223–24 (analyzing how lower courts apply Cuyler); see also 
Mark W. Shiner, Conflicts of Interest Challenges Post Mickens v. Taylor: Redefining the Defendant’s 
Burden in Concurrent, Successive, and Personal Interest Conflicts, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 965, 977 
& n.94 (2003) (noting the lack of clarity as to what would constitute a conflict of interest and citing 
Supreme Court cases discussing the different ways in which the standard has been applied by lower 
courts). 
81. 450 U.S. 261 (1981). 
82. Id. at 273. 
83. 535 U.S. 162 (2002). 
84. Id. at 164. 












counsel require a showing of an actual conflict of interest that adversely 
affected the lawyer’s performance.86  
 i. “Adversely affecting the lawyer’s performance” 
More importantly for our purposes here, Mickens provided a hasty 
application, though not an explanation, of the meaning of “an actual conflict 
of interest that adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Byran 
Saunders had been appointed to represent a juvenile, Timothy Hall, on 
assault and weapons charges on March 20, 1992, and within ten days of 
their first meeting, Hall was murdered.87 Four days after Hall’s body was 
discovered, a juvenile court judge dismissed the charges against Hall, and 
then, three days later, the same judge appointed Saunders to represent 
Walter Mickens on charges that he had murdered Hall during the course of 
attempting to forcibly sodomize him.88 Saunders became lead trial counsel 
in  Mickens’s capital case, and did not tell either his co-counsel or Mickens 
that he represented the victim at the time of the murder.89 
Some might think moving from representation of one client to 
representing his murderer would be problematic, but Saunders did not.90 
Although in fact a lawyer’s fiduciary relationship with a client survives the 
client’s death,91 Saunders testified in postconviction proceedings that his 
allegiance to Hall “[e]nded when . . . they told me he was dead.”92 For the 
majority, this was enough: Saunders’s erroneous belief was a sufficient 
basis for concluding that Mickens could not establish the requisite adverse 
effect on counsel’s performance.93  
The brevity of the majority’s treatment of the question of whether 
adverse effect had been demonstrated may be attributable to the fact that it 
was not the question on which certiorari was granted, and Justice Souter’s 
dissent, like the majority opinion, focuses on whether reversal is automatic 
when a trial judge who is on notice of a potential conflict fails to avoid it. 
But Souter devoted a long footnote to “noting that the case for an adverse 
effect appears compelling in at least two respects.”94  
 
86. Id. at 173–74. 
87. Id. at 164. 
88. Id. at 164–65. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 177 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
91. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
92. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 177 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
93. Id. at 173–74 (majority opinion). 
94. Id. at 208 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
In this footnote Souter first observed that Saunders admitted that he failed to even discuss with 
Mickens whether they should pursue a trial strategy of creating reasonable doubt about whether the sex 
was consensual, a crucial matter because, without forcible sex, the murder would not have been death-
eligible. Id. Moreover, Saunders neglected leads suggesting that the victim had engaged in prostitution, 












Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented on a different, 
albeit related ground. For them, the question of how most conflict of interest 
cases should be resolved was beside the point because Mickens was an 
extraordinary case that should not be governed by more general 
precedents.95 Three factors—that the case was capital, that the 
representational incompatibility was facially egregious, and that the State 
created the conflict by appointing Saunders—taken together, constituted a 
“breakdown in the criminal justice system” that calls its legitimacy into 
question.96  
Justice Stevens echoed Souter’s objections, and also agreed with Breyer 
that the appearance of justice is of independent importance, and is fatally 
compromised in a capital case where the State “foist[s] a murder victim’s 
lawyer onto his accused.”97 But Stevens’s opinion also explores territory not 
covered by either Souter or Breyer, arguing that the attorney-client 
relationship in a capital case depends on building trust, which is precluded 
when a lawyer decides to conceal from his client a fact as important as prior 
representation of the victim.98 Because of the importance of the attorney-
client relationship, Stevens would “presume that the lawyer for the victim 
of a brutal homicide is incapable of establishing the kind of relationship 
with the defendant that is essential to effective representation.”99 
 ii. Conflicts of Interest 
Until the Supreme Court’s decision, everyone seems to have assumed 
that Saunders’s prior representation of the victim constituted a “conflict of 
interest,” and that the germane questions were whether he had to show 
anything more than the existence of such a conflict, given the trial judge’s 
awareness of the conflict, and if not, whether Mickens had established that 
the conflict “adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Both of the 
lower court opinions make this assumption, and, from a professional 
responsibility standpoint, there was no doubt that Saunders had a continuing 
 
even though his body was found in an area where it was common. Id. Souter acknowledged that these 
omissions may have resulted from strategy or incompetence, rather than a conflicting duty of loyalty to 
the victim, but noted that strategic choice seemed unlikely, given that Saunders did not raise the 
possibility of such a defense with his client. Id. In contrast, Souter opined that there was little doubt as 
to the source of the second adverse impact Mickens had alleged: that Saunders knew that the victim’s 
mother had initiated charges of assault and battery against her son just before he died, yet did nothing to 
counter the mother’s assertion in the post-trial victim impact statement given to the trial judge that “all 
[she] lived for was that boy.” Id.  
95. Id. at 209–11 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
96. Id. at 210–11. 
97. Id. at 189 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 180. 












duty of loyalty to Hall, and should not have undertaken representation of 
Mickens, at least not without informing Mickens of the potential conflict 
and obtaining a waiver from him. Indeed, a group of experts in legal ethics 
filed an amicus curiae brief submitting that this conflict was in fact 
nonwaivable according to the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.100  
Most of the majority’s opinion does not question the application of the 
conflict of interest cases—however they might properly be interpreted—to 
this kind of conflict. The last section of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, 
however, casts doubt on that categorization. “Lest today’s holding be 
misconstrued,” it notes that the only question presented was the effect of a 
trial court’s failure to inquire into a potential conflict on the Cuyler rule, and 
that “[t]he case was presented and argued on the assumption that (absent 
some exception for failure to inquire) [Cuyler v. Sullivan] would be 
applicable—requiring a showing of defective performance, but not 
requiring in addition (as Strickland does . . .), a showing of probable effect 
upon the outcome of trial.”101 Justice Scalia conceded that such an 
assumption was “not unreasonable” given lower court decisions applying 
the Cuyler standard to a variety of attorney ethical conflicts, including 
conflicts rooted in obligations to former clients, pecuniary stake in the 
outcome of a case, a romantic relationship with the prosecutor, or fear of 
alienating the trial judge.102 He admonished, however, that the language of 
Cuyler itself “does not clearly establish, or indeed even support, such 
expansive application,”103 and that both Cuyler and Holloway emphasized 
the high likelihood of prejudice arising from multiple concurrent 
representation.104  
There is no conclusion to this unexpected caveat, but only the assertion 
that the purpose of the Cuyler/Holloway “exceptions from the ordinary 
requirements of Strickland . . . is not to enforce the Canons of Legal Ethics, 
but to apply needed prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is 
evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.”105 The opinion ends ambiguously: “Whether 
[Cuyler v. Sullivan] should be extended to [reach successive representation] 
cases remains, as far as the jurisprudence of this Court is concerned, an open 
question.”106  
 
100. Brief for Legal Ethicists & Stein Center for Law and Ethics as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 16–17, Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (No. 00-9285). 
101. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174. 
102. Id. at 174–75. 
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3. Terrible Lawyers 
Last are the largest group of counsel failures, those involving present, 
unconflicted, but just plain terrible lawyers. Strickland v. Washington107 
forced the Court “to consider the proper standards for judging a criminal 
defendant’s contention that the Constitution requires a conviction or death 
sentence to be set aside because counsel’s assistance at the trial or 
sentencing was ineffective.”108 Strickland involved three murders, and a 
lawyer who “cut his efforts short . . . [and] experienced a sense of 
hopelessness about the case” when he learned that, contrary to his 
instructions, his client confessed to two of the murders.109 Strickland’s 
lawyer decided not to investigate evidence concerning his client’s mental 
and emotional state, both because of his hopelessness and because of his 
judgment that it was advisable to rely upon the plea colloquy for evidence 
of Strickland’s mental state, background, and remorse.110  
The Court began by noting that the constitutional command is not 
satisfied by the fact “[t]hat a person who happens to be a lawyer is present 
at trial alongside the accused.”111 Rather, because the constitutional 
command “envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of 
the adversarial system to produce just results,” it requires the accused’s 
attorney, “whether retained or appointed,” to “play[] the role necessary to 
ensure that the trial is fair.”112 Consequently, the “benchmark for judging 
any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”113 
From this “benchmark,” the majority devised a two-prong test for 
ineffectiveness: first, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance 
was deficient; and second, he must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.114 The Court’s elaboration of these prongs—hotly 
objected to by Justice Marshall115—made them both very hard to satisfy. 
 
107. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
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113. Id. at 686. 
114. Id. at 687. 
115. Id. at 712 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Even if I were inclined to join the majority’s two central 
holdings, I could not abide the manner in which the majority elaborates upon its rulings. Particularly 
regrettable are the majority’s discussion of the ‘presumption’ of reasonableness to be accorded lawyers’ 
decisions and its attempt to prejudge the merits of claims previously rejected by lower courts using 












The proper standard for attorney performance is that of “reasonably 
effective assistance.”116 Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be 
“highly deferential,” and a court must “indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.”117 More particularly, the defendant must overcome a 
presumption that the challenged actions or omissions “might be considered 
sound trial strategy.”118 Finally, “strategic choices made after thorough 
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 
unchallengeable,” and even those made after incomplete investigation are 
reasonable “to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the 
limitations on investigation.”119 
After acknowledging that in certain contexts (such as actual or 
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel, state interference with 
counsel’s assistance, or actual conflicts of interests) its precedents presumed 
prejudice, the Court defended the imposition of a prejudice requirement in 
the ordinary ineffective assistance case on two grounds. First it explained 
that “[t]he government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, 
attorney errors;” and second, it observed that attorney errors “come in an 
infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case 
as they are to be prejudicial.”120  
The Court then chose a stringent prejudice requirement: A defendant 
must show that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”121 The Strickland majority also urged lower courts to consider 
dispensing with analysis of counsel’s performance when they could more 
expeditiously “dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice.”122 
Perhaps not surprisingly, lower courts since Strickland have been eager 
to avoid assessing the adequacy of counsel’s performance and frequently 
dismiss ineffective assistance of counsel claims on the prejudice prong 
without first addressing counsel’s competence.123 For courts resistant to 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the prejudice hurdle is 
 
116. Id. at 687 (majority opinion). 
117. Id. at 689. 
118. Id. (quoting Michel v. Lousiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
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123. See Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System 
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convenient.124 Until Williams v. Taylor,125 decided in 2000, no Supreme 
Court case found Strickland prejudice.126 And to this day, no Supreme Court 
case has found Strickland prejudice in the context of a non-capital trial. 
Moreover, even in capital cases decided after Williams, lower courts were 
extraordinarily reluctant to find prejudice;127 until 2008,128 the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had never found counsel ineffective in a capital 
case, a perfect score made possible in part by its manipulation of the 
prejudice prong.129 
Only Justice Marshall dissented from Strickland. He objected to the 
performance standard on the ground that “it is so malleable that, in practice, 
it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation” in its 
application.130 He objected to the prejudice standard for two reasons, most 
fundamentally because he thought the Sixth Amendment was not solely 
directed at reducing the incidence of wrongful conviction, but also designed 
to ensure that convictions are obtained through fundamentally fair 
procedures.131 
Whatever the merits of that perspective on the purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, time and precedent have left it behind. Still 
relevant today, however, is Marshall’s practical objection to the prejudice 
prong: 
Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good 
defense counsel. On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible 
for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain how the government’s 
 
124. See id. at 20–21; Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1259, 1271 (1986) (“[T]he difficult burden of proving prejudice that the Court in Strickland v. 
Washington places on the defendant allows a court to sweep attorney incompetence under the rug of a 
conviction that was affirmed because a defendant could not prove prejudice. The attorney's 
incompetence is quietly forgotten.”). 
125. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
126. See John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. 
Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the 
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 134 (2007). 
127. See Kenneth Williams, Does Strickland Prejudice Defendants on Death Row?, 43 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1459, 1472–79 (2009) (analyzing capital cases in four circuits from 2003 to 2008 and finding 
that only fourteen out of 158 ineffective assistance of counsel claims were successful). 
128. Gray v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009). It bears 
noting that Gray, a dentist, was that rare bird, a middle class capital defendant. Gray was sentenced to 
death for murdering his wife. 
129. See John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Fourth Circuit’s “Double-Edged Sword”: 
Eviscerating the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence and Beheading the Right to the Assistance of 
Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1480 (1999); see also Williams, supra note 127, at 1473 (showing that from 
1998 to 2008, the Fourth Circuit did not find that counsel was ineffective in any of the seventy-seven 
capital cases it decided). 
130. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 












evidence and arguments would have stood up against rebuttal and 
cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer. The 
difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by 
the possibility that evidence of injury to the defendant may be 
missing from the record precisely because of the incompetence of 
defense counsel.132 
This objection to a prejudice inquiry lives today, though not in run-of-
the-mill ineffective assistance of counsel cases governed by Strickland. 
While Marshall raised—and the majority implicitly rejected—the argument 
that prejudice cannot reliably be assessed in ordinary ineffective assistance 
cases governed by Strickland, no member of the Court has questioned the 
proposition that accurate measurement of prejudice is impossible in the 
other two categories of counsel failure. 
II. LOWER COURT APPLICATIONS OF CRONIC AND CUYLER 
The lower courts have struggled to apply Cronic and Cuyler. The cases 
attempting to do so are striking in two respects. First, they suggest a 
disturbing variety of professional lapses, or perhaps, viewed through 
another lens, demonstrate that lawyers reflect the diverse frailties of human 
beings. And second, they demonstrate the indeterminacy of the Court's 
guidance concerning the three categories. 
A. Lapses and Frailties of the Defense Bar 
I put aside three categories of failings that are clearly within the sole 
ambit of Strickland: sloth, ignorance, and stupidity. Lawyers that are lazy, 
uninformed, or dumb are doubtless “terrible,” but are not—at least not for 
that reason—“truant” or “torn.” I first summarize lower court reactions to 
variations of counsel failures that might be considered to stem from 
constructive absence, and then those that arguably reflect conflicted loyalty.  
1. Truant? 
a. Lack of Licensure 
A “lawyer” who fraudulently claims to have passed the bar may be 
assigned to a case, and when the fraud is discovered, prejudice is generally 
presumed.133 More commonly, a disbarred lawyer is mistakenly assigned to 
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per se rule of ineffectiveness where an unknowing defendant is represented by someone who has not 












a case, or a lawyer in good standing is assigned to a case, and then suspended 
from the practice of law, but continues to represent a criminal defendant. 
Courts are split on what should happen in such cases.134 Courts tend to find 
less troubling—and are less likely to presume prejudice in—the cases where 
a defendant’s only lawyer, though not licensed to practice law in the state 
pressing criminal charges, is licensed in another state.135 The Second Circuit 
has proposed the distinction between “substantive” and “technical” defects 
in bar licensure. In its view, technical defects, such as failure to pay bar 
dues, do not reflect the attorney's substantive qualifications to practice law, 
and consequently do not result in a presumption of prejudice.136 On the other 
hand, substantive defects, such as failure to meet the requirements of bar 
admission, do warrant that presumption.137  
b. Lack of Opportunity 
Courts have been generally unsympathetic to claims that counsel had 
insufficient time to adequately prepare, and relegate such cases to 
 
been admitted to any bar); Bond v. United States, 1 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1993) (same); Solina v. 
United States, 709 F.2d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 1983) (vacating conviction where attorney had graduated from 
an accredited law school and had never been admitted to any bar); Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d 
203, 212–14 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (conviction reversed because government used defendant's statements 
from earlier trial in which defendant was represented by ex-convict posing as a lawyer), rev'd on other 
grounds, 392 U.S. 219 (1968); People v. Williams, 530 N.Y.S.2d 472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (conviction 
reversed where defendant’s attorney was disbarred because he had never met the requirements to 
practice law). 
134. Compare Elfgeeh v. United States, 681 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2012) (per se ineffectiveness rule 
applies to representation by an individual who, before the representation in question, has been disbarred 
in all jurisdictions where he or she was once admitted), People v. Chin Min Foo, 545 N.Y.S.2d 55 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1989) (same), In re Johnson, 822 P.2d 1317 (Cal. 1992) (prejudice presumed where attorney 
suspended from practice), and State v. Newcome, 577 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (same), with 
United States v. Bosch, 914 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1990) (attorney suspended from practice during course 
of trial does not lead to a presumption of prejudice), and Commonwealth v. Wilson, 819 N.E.2d 919, 
932 n.23 (Mass. 2004) (fact that counsel was previously disbarred did not create presumption of 
prejudice); see also United States v. Hoffman, 733 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1984) (attorney suspended from 
home state bar, but not suspended from federal bar during defendant's trial, qualifies as “counsel” under 
the Sixth Amendment); Washington v. Moore, 421 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 2005) (where law-student intern 
presented defendant’s case-in-chief and handled the direct and re-direct examinations of alibi witnesses, 
prejudice was not presumed under Cronic because counsel was present during the trial).  
135. Mallory v. State, 954 N.E.2d 933, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Chadwick, 586 N.W.2d 
391, 393–94 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998); see also Pagan v. Comm’r of Correction, 935 A.2d 175, 177 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2007) (absence of local counsel to accompany pro hac vice counsel is not necessarily a denial 
of counsel). 
136. United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 888 (2d Cir. 1990). 
137. Id. at 890; see also Bear v. United States, 777 F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2015) (no per se 
ineffectivenss when counsel was trained and qualified but had licensing problems); Reese v. Peters, 926 













Strickland.138 However, truly extreme circumstances occasionally are 
sufficient to invoke the specter of Powell v. Alabama, and result in a 
presumption of prejudice.139 
c. Inaction and Absence 
Prior to Bell v. Cone, some lower courts had found inaction during 
significant portions of the trial sufficient to presume prejudice.140 But Cone 
settled the question of whether inaction during some portion of the trial 
creates a winning Cronic claim: it does not.141 Cone does, however, suggest 
that cases finding that prejudice is presumed when a lawyer does nothing at 
all or explicitly refuses to do anything may still be good law.142  
 
138. Lenz v. Washington, 444 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Lenz v. Kelly, 127 
S. Ct. 103; United States v. Oliver, 118 F.3d 562, 565–66 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant's 
contention that the court's scheduling of trial and admission of certain evidence prevented counsel from 
“mounting a meaningful defense to the government's case”); Camargo v. State, 55 S.W.3d 255, 263 
(2001); Rinehart v. State, 883 So. 2d 573, 576–77 (Miss. 2004); State v. Morgan, 604 S.E.2d 886, 894–
95 (N.C. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 830 (2005); State v. Ahmed, 813 N.E.2d 637, 664 (Ohio 2004), 
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 952 (2005). 
139. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mitchell, 261 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2001) (presuming prejudice where counsel 
was appointed on the day trial began). But see Avery v. Procunier, 750 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(appointment morning of trial does not create presumption of prejudice).  
140. See Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245 (6th Cir. 1984) (presuming prejudice where counsel did 
not participate in jury selection, cross-examine any witnesses, make any objections, call any witnesses 
for the defense, make any closing argument, or object to any part of the court's charge to the jury); Appel 
v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2001) (presumed prejudice in a capital case where counsel did not 
investigate and failed to make an argument at a pre-trial competency hearing); Childress v. Johnson, 103 
F.3d 1221 (5th Cir. 1997) (presumed prejudice where counsel never investigated the facts, never 
discussed the applicable law with [the defendant], and never advised him of the rights he would surrender 
by pleading guilty); Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1992) (presumed prejudice where counsel 
did not confer with defendant and made no attempt to represent his client’s interests during a 
resentencing hearing). 
141. See Castillo v. Florida, 722 F.3d 1281, 1289–91 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Allowing an attorney’s 
failure to object to a constitutional or otherwise important error to warrant a presumption of prejudice 
would run counter to a wall of binding precedent from Strickland forward; it would obliterate the 
complete-denial and total-failure elements of Cronic’s first two exceptions; and it would significantly 
stretch Cronic’s deliberately narrow exceptions to swallow Strickland’s general rule. . . . We look to the 
facts of the Harding case to frame the holding of that decision. The holding, and the only holding, is that 
under those total-failure-throughout facts prejudice is presumed.”).  
142. See, e.g., Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245 (6th Cir. 1984) (presuming prejudice under Cronic 
where lawyer explicitly refused to participate in the trial); United States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260, 1266 
(10th Cir. 2005) (defendant was constructively denied counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings when 
counsel sought to withdraw from representation but the court went ahead with Collins's competency 
hearing and found him competent before addressing the motion to withdraw, and although physically 
present, counsel did not participate in the competency hearing in any meaningful way, remaining silent 
throughout, failing to provide the court with relevant mitigating information, and utterly failing to test 
the prosecution's case, which led the Tenth Circuit to conclude that the attorney's conduct was "akin to 
the conduct of counsel who sleeps through portions of trial"); Harding v. Davis, 878 F.2d 1341 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (presuming prejudice under Cronic where counsel made no opening or closing statements, 
presented no witnesses, and cross-examined no witnesses). 












Lower courts have attempted various distinctions when faced with 
attorneys who are not present for some portion of the proceedings, generally 
holding that absence during a critical stage of the prosecution does trigger 
the presumption of prejudice.143 But these courts sometimes issue a caveat 
that temporary absences from court proceedings do not necessarily 
constitute a constructive denial of counsel.144 
d. Impairments: Sleeping, Drug Addiction, and Mental Illness 
This article’s introduction included Burdine, in which a lawyer slept 
through significant portions of the trial. The Ninth and Second Circuits also 
have considered when sleeping by trial counsel becomes the effective denial 
of counsel because it “so likely . . . prejudice[s] the accused”145 that Cronic 
applies and prejudice is presumed. Both have held that the denial of counsel 
with presumed prejudice only occurs once counsel sleeps through a 
“substantial portion of [defendant's] trial.”146 The Sixth Circuit, while not 
disavowing this approach, determined that sleeping during a single cross-
examination did not constitute a Cronic denial of counsel, but must be 
analyzed under Strickland.147 No court of which I am aware has attempted 
to reconcile this approach with the Supreme Court’s rationale in Bell v. 
Cone, which emphasizes that failure to advocate during a portion of the trial 
cannot establish a Cronic claim.  
 
143. See, e.g., French v. Jones, 332 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding denial of counsel at a critical 
stage in the proceedings under Cronic where counsel was not present when the trial court gave a 
supplemental jury instruction to a deadlocked jury), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1018; Hunter v. Moore, 304 
F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2002) (defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at a critical stage in 
the proceedings under Cronic where, following the close of evidence in a non-jury trial, the court 
immediately entered a guilty verdict without providing opportunity for the defense to make a closing 
argument or to make an objection); Robinson v. Norris, 60 F.3d 457 (8th Cir. 1995); Golden v. 
Newsome, 755 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985); State v. Hendershot, 153 P.3d 619, 171 (Mont. 2007) 
(“McLaverty did not attend either of the two substantive procedural hearings—Hendershot's revocation 
hearing and the hearing on the adequacy of his representation.”); McKnight v. State, 465 S.E.2d 352, 
354 n.2 (S.C. 1995) (counsel absent during testimony of the victim); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976 
(9th Cir. 2000) (prejudice presumed where counsel was absent from every proceeding except change of 
plea).  
144. See, e.g., Vines v. United States, 28 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 1994) (counsel's temporary absence 
from trial during the presentation of testimony and evidence not directly related to the defendant did not 
constitute a complete denial of counsel nor denial of counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings, 
and hence, Cronic was inapplicable); see also McKnight, 465 S.E.2d at 354 n.2 (“Some absences might 
be so de minimis they would have no constitutional significance.”). 
145. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). 
146. Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1984); Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 
685 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding the defendant's right to counsel was violated where defense counsel was 
asleep for “numerous extended periods of time”). 












As the Burdine majority took pains to make clear, other impairments get 
much less favorable treatment than somnolence:  
The State maintains that it is impossible to distinguish between 
sleeping counsel and other impairments that nevertheless have been 
subjected to prejudice analysis. We disagree. An unconscious 
attorney does not, indeed cannot, perform at all. This fact 
distinguishes the sleeping lawyer from the drunk or drugged one. 
Even the intoxicated attorney exercises judgment, though perhaps 
impaired, on behalf of his client at all times during a trial. Yet, the 
attorney that is unconscious during critical stages of a trial is simply 
not capable of exercising judgment. The unconscious attorney is in 
fact no different from an attorney that is physically absent from trial 
since both are equally unable to exercise judgment on behalf of their 
clients. Such absence of counsel at a critical stage of a proceeding 
makes the adversary process unreliable, and thus a presumption of 
prejudice is warranted pursuant to Cronic.148 
As this purported distinction149 suggests, prior to Burdine, two Fifth 
Circuit cases had established that neither an attorney’s addiction to illegal 
drugs150 nor his alcoholism gave rise to a presumption of prejudice.151 Other 
circuits that have addressed addiction and alcoholism have agreed. The 
Sixth Circuit refused to find ineffective assistance of counsel based on a 
claim that counsel was using cocaine at the time of trial, and indeed had 
been arrested three weeks before his appearance in the case.152 That court 
reasoned that although he was later suspended for his drug use, he was a 
licensed attorney at the time of trial.153 Similarly, when a defendant claimed 
his counsel was drunk during his trial, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
 
148. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Cockrell v. 
Burdine, 535 U.S. 1120 (2002). 
149. An unpublished Ninth Circuit decision prior to Burdine adopted the same distinction. United 
States v. Carrillo, C.A. No. 96-16597, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5680 (9th Cir. Mar. 13, 1997). 
150. Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1985) (addiction to illegal drugs), cert. denied, 
476 U.S. 1164 (1986). 
151. Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 928–30 (5th Cir. 1993) (during trial, defendant could smell 
alcohol on attorney’s breath, and after trial, attorney entered a facility for treatment of alcohol abuse). 
Since Burdine, the Fifth Circuit has reaffirmed that intoxication during trial does not obviate the need to 
show prejudice under Strickland. Kelly v. Cockrell, 72 F. App’x 67, 82 (5th Cir. 2003).  
152. Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1575 (2012). 
153. Id. at 625; see also Ivory v. Jackson, 509 F.3d 284 (6th Cir. 2007) (recently discovered 
evidence that trial counsel's license was suspended for use of drugs and alcohol after he represented the 
defendant, and admissions during these proceedings that substance abuse was a problem during the 
representation, did not excuse procedural default of defendant's ineffective assistance claim; Ivory 
himself filed one of the complaints that led to the disciplinary proceedings before his direct appeal was 
filed, and thus, was clearly on notice of counsel's possible ineffectiveness and the reasons for it when he 
appealed), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1322 (2008); Coates v. McCormick, 5 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding 
drug use alone does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). 












federal district court’s decision, which held that prejudice should not be 
presumed.154 
Nor have demonstrations that counsel was mentally ill led courts to 
presume prejudice.155 In two of these cases, mental illness was clearly the 
source of very bizarre trial behavior, but nonetheless did not lead to a 
presumption of prejudice. The Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that 
defense counsel's bipolar disorder requires a per se presumption of 
prejudice, even in the face of “numerous examples of [counsel's] conduct 
before and during trial which seemed unprofessional,” including “lying to 
the petitioner about his experience in capital cases, submitting a false 
application for malpractice insurance, being unprepared to present the 
petitioner's case, and appearing confused at trial.”156 Yet more striking is the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Young v. Runnels,157 where the lawyer in 
question falsely charged opposing counsel in another case with being 
involved with a pedophile ring, threatened the life of another opposing 
counsel, threatened her own former paralegal, falsely accused a former 
client of terrorism and of stalking her, accused the same former client and 
his new counsel of being “supremacist militia members,” and during 
proceedings before the state bar court, “repeatedly screamed at the Court, 
refused to follow rulings and directions, and made direct threats toward the 
Court and Trial Counsel. . . . [causing] the Court the gravest concern that 
[she] is not capable of conducting herself properly in any court of law.”158 
Judge Noonan concurred, stating that precedent did not permit the 
presumption of prejudice, but called the result a “cruel parody of the right 
to counsel,”159 finding the distinction between cases that do presume 
prejudice and those that do not “bizarre.”160 
 
154. Hernandez v. Wainwright, 634 F. Supp. 241, 245 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd, 813 F.2d 409 (11th 
Cir. 1987); see also Hamilton v. State, 226 P.3d 588 (Mont. 2010) (refusing to hold a hearing on the 
defendant’s allegations that defense counsel was addicted to drugs and alcohol because there was no 
proof of deficient performance).  
155. Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Norris, 207 F.3d 515 (8th Cir. 
2000) (bipolar disorder), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 886; Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 485–86 (9th Cir. 
2000) (counsel had late stage Alzheimer's disease eighteen months after trial); Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 
872, 875–76 (9th Cir. 1987) (mental illness), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988); Young v. Runnels, 435 
F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2006) (lawyer with delusions), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1033; see also State v. Brewer, 
699 A.2d 1139 (Me. 1997) (defense counsel's mental and physical problems, for which he was being 
treated during trial, do not create presumption of prejudice).  
156. Johnson, 207 F.3d at 517. 
157. 435 F.3d 1038. 
158. Id. at 1044–45 (Noonan, J., concurring). 
159. Id. at 1046. 
160. It is conceded by all that if Darris Young had been represented by a college student or a 
cobbler or counsel not admitted to the California bar he would have been denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. But his case is different because he was represented by a fully 












e. Antagonism Toward the Client 
In Morris v. Slappy, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
does not guarantee “a right to counsel with whom the accused has a 
‘meaningful attorney-client relationship,’”161 and no court since Slappy has 
held that an attorney’s failure to get along with a client is a basis for 
presuming either prejudice or a conflict.162 However, in two kinds of cases, 
counsel’s antagonism toward the client has sometimes been viewed as 
tantamount to the denial of counsel.  
First, where a lawyer advocates for the prosecution rather than the 
defendant, prejudice has been presumed by some courts. According to the 
Ninth Circuit, when a defense attorney tells the jury that “it is his view of 
the evidence that there is no reasonable doubt regarding the only factual 
issues that are in dispute,” prejudice is presumed under Cronic, for that 
lawyer “has utterly failed to ‘subject the prosecution's case to meaningful 
adversarial testing.’”163 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit was following the 
lead of the Tenth that “an attorney who adopts and acts upon a belief that 
his client should be convicted ‘fail[s] to function in any meaningful sense 
as the Government's adversary.’”164 This view, or at least its application, is 
not universal. The Fourth Circuit, when confronted with a lawyer who told 
Ricky Drayton’s capital jury, “You want to sentence him to death, O.K.,” 
 
remove from a position where she could harm the public, the courts, and her clients! A fully 
licensed lawyer with her head full of fantasies and “with complete lack of insight into the 
wrongfulness of her actions” was counsel enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment! As Judge 
Ferguson's opinion indicates, precedent apparently requires this bizarre conclusion. Only the 
Supreme Court of the United States can eliminate this cruel parody of the right to counsel. 
Id. at 1045–46. 
161. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1983). 
162. See, e.g., Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464 (Fla. 2010), as revised on denial of reh'g, (Feb. 10, 
2011). Clients are, however, entitled to make major decisions, such as whether or not to plead guilty, or 
plead insanity, or testify. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (the defendant has “the ultimate 
authority” to determine “whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take 
an appeal”).  
163. United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)) (prejudice presumed where lawyer concedes both elements of the 
offense and client’s identity as perpetrator). But see Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (attorney 
need not obtain explicit consent from client to concede guilt in a capital trial where doing so may be 
good strategy). 
164. Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 625, 629 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 
666) (presuming prejudice where counsel informed the judge in a letter, subsequently submitted to the 
state supreme court hearing Osborn's appeal, that his client deserved the death sentence, that the 
defendant brought it on himself, and later insisted that whether it helped his client “wasn't my concern”); 
see also Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1159 (6th Cir. 1997) (presuming prejudice where extremely 
damaging images of the defendant came from his own attorney, who was not responding to testimony 
or improper arguments by the prosecution, but himself “present[ed] a terrifying image of [the defendant], 
and thereby aligned himself with the prosecution against his own client”); In re Personal Restraint of 
Benn, 952 P.2d 116 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (finding that a defense attorney who effectively joins the 
State in an effort to attain conviction or death sentence suffers from an obvious conflict of interest). 












deemed Strickland rather than Cronic controlling.165 It then held—
remarkably cavalierly in my view—that “even assuming” this was deficient 
performance, prejudice had not been established.166  
Second, where defense counsel expresses racial antagonism toward the 
client one court has—once—presumed prejudice. This is the problem posed 
by Ellis v. Harrison, the case with which this article began, and its unsteady 
history in the Ninth Circuit stretches back more than twenty years ago to 
Frazer v. United States.167 In the early nineties a district court, relying on 
the lack of a showing of prejudice, refused to hold a hearing on a habeas 
petitioner’s claim that his counsel called him a “stupid [n****] son of a 
bitch and said he hopes I get life [for the crime of bank robbery] . . . And if 
I continue to insist on going to trial I will find him to be very ineffective.”168 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, saying:  
If the Sixth Amendment itself protects an accused from a lawyer with 
a traditional conflict of interest, and from a lawyer who is asleep, 
completely disinterested, or so unprepared that his appearance is 
merely pro forma, surely it must protect the indigent from an 
appointed lawyer who calls him to his face a “stupid [n****] son of 
a bitch” and who threatens to provide substandard performance for 
him if he chooses to exercise his right to go to trial.169 
Though the language is bold, the categorization is unclear. Perhaps when 
it decided Frazer, the Ninth Circuit thought the result so obvious that it was 
unnecessary to choose between a Cronic and a Cuyler rationale. But if so, 
the solicitude proved short-lived, or at least tightly cabined. As the per 
curiam opinion in Ellis later would put it: “To the extent Frazer held that 
defense counsel’s extreme animus towards the persons of the defendant’s 
race violates the Sixth Amendment without need to show prejudice, 
 
165. Drayton v. Moore, No. 98-18, 1999 WL 10073 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1999) (per curiam). The 
opinion does not report what trial counsel said to the jury; I know because I represented Drayton in the 
Fourth Circuit. Transcript on file with author. 
166. Id. at *2.  
The First Circuit has explicitly rejected the approach of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits:  
We believe [Osborne and Swanson] misperceive the rationale underlying the Cronic exception. 
In our view, the Court's language in Cronic was driven by the recognition that certain types of 
conduct are in general so antithetic to effective assistance . . . that a case-by-case analysis 
simply is not worth the cost of protracted litigation. No matter what the facts of a given case 
may be, this sort of conduct will almost always result in prejudice. But attorney errors particular 
to the facts of an individual case are qualitatively different.  
Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
167.  18 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 1994).  
168. Id. at 780.  












Mayfield [v. Woodford] implicitly overruled that holding.”170 Mayfield held 
that unless a defendant could show that, during a critical phase of the 
proceedings, he was aware of his lawyers racial antagonism, the ordinary 
rule of Strickland would apply, and prejudice would not be presumed.171 
And thus it was Mayfield that Judge Nguyen railed against last year in 
Ellis—but believed the panel to be bound by. The Ninth Circuit sitting en 
banc has now heard argument, but the argument does not (at least to my 
ears) reveal what the outcome will be. 
It is worth noting that Mayfield is not an outlier. In this century, no 
defendant of which I am aware has persuaded a court to presume prejudice 
based upon his lawyer’s racial antagonism. The optimistic reader may be 
imagining that this is because no recent case has involved such blatant racial 
hostility—but if so, she would be wrong. I am aware of five cases decided 
since 2000 in which defense counsel used a racial epithet towards his client, 
and in none of them did the reviewing court presume prejudice.172 Most 
remarkable is Osborne v. Terry,173 in which the Eleventh Circuit declined 
to presume prejudice from a lawyer’s statement about Curtis Osborne, his 
client, “That little n**** deserves the chair,” even though coupled with the 
lawyer’s boast that he would hire no experts to examine Osborne.174 The 
Osborne court also more sweepingly declared that although there is a 
constitutional prohibition against race-based decisionmaking by a 
prosecutor, there is no prohibition against race-based animus on the part of 
defense counsel.175   
2. Torn? 
The species of attempts at invoking Cuyler is large indeed, and below I 
try to sample rather than fully catalog them; I summarize conflicts alleged 
to stem from other clients, financial or professional stake, romantic or 
sexual relationships, criminal charges, and animosity.176 
 
170. Ellis v. Harrison, 891 F.3d 1160, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2018). 
171. Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001). 
172. See Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., Racial Epithets in the Criminal Process, 2011 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 755, 768–72 (describing cases).  
173. 466 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2006).  
174. Id. at 1316.  
175. Id. at 1318. 
176. For more complete lists, see Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Circumstances Giving Rise to 
Prejudicial Conflict of Interests Between Criminal Defendant and Defense Counsel—State Cases, 18 
A.L.R.4th 360 (1982); Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Circumstances Giving Rise to Prejudicial Conflict 
of Interests Between Criminal Defendant and Defense Counsel—Federal Cases, 53 A.L.R. Fed. 140 
(1981).  












a. Other Clients 
Even the seemingly clearest conflict—between or among criminal 
codefendants—is so complicated that it has its own A.L.R. annotation.177 
While it is clear that concurrent representation of codefendants, the 
paradigmatic claim of both Cuyler and Holloway, can give rise to a conflict 
claim, it is equally clear that it does not always do so. Beyond that, multiple 
representation of codefendants is a jungle of possibilities. What if defense 
counsel represented both defendants for a significant period of time, and 
then chose one? What if defense counsel previously represented the 
codefendant on other charges? What if she is presently representing him on 
another charge? What if she represents him on a civil matter? What if her 
partner (or former partner, or spouse) represents the codefendant, or 
represented him on a previous charge, or in a civil matter? As even 
skimming the annotation makes clear, there is little agreement on these 
variations. Moreover, Mickens added confusion rather than clarity. Prior to 
Mickens, all circuits had assumed that successive (rather than concurrent) 
representation of codefendants could—under the right circumstances—
trigger the conflict standard. After Mickens, they have continued to do so, 
albeit a little nervously. As the Fifth Circuit explained in a post-Mickens 
case, it was not ready to jettison all successive representation conflicts based 
solely upon the Supreme Court’s cautionary note that “[w]hether [Cuyler v. 
Sullivan] should be extended to [successive representation] cases remains, 
as far as the jurisprudence of this Court is concerned, an open question,”178 
given both circuit precedent, and the lack of persuasiveness of a distinction 
between concurrent and successive representation.179 
Less clear yet is the approach that should be taken when it is not a 
codefendant, but some other participant in the proceedings who is or was 
represented by counsel on another matter. Mickens provides one example: 
prior representation of the victim. But even with respect to that particular 
relationship, Mickens gives little guidance, for its rationale depends on the 
fact that Mickens’s lawyer perceived no ongoing duty to the former client/ 
homicide victim.180 Most lawyers, however, would recognize that ethics 
rules provide that duties to the client survive the client’s death. In other 
 
177. Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Circumstances Giving Rise to Conflict of Interest Between 
or Among Criminal Codefendants Precluding Representation by Same Counsel, 34 A.L.R.3d 470 
(1970). 
178. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (2002). 
179. United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 391 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Hall v. United States, 
371 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2004). 












cases,  the other client is not the victim, but a witness for the State,181 or the 
prosecutor in the case,182 or the State itself,183 or someone with a stake in a 
related civil proceeding.184  
A few courts have drawn a bright line, refusing to read Cuyler to include 
anything beyond multiple representation of codefendants.185 Most courts, 
however, find conflicts that trigger the Cuyler standard in at least some 
extreme situations where loyalty is obviously divided, despite the fact that 
the conflicting loyalty is not to another client.186 
 
181. See, e.g., Perillo v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding attorney's concurrent 
representation of capital murder defendant and witness who had been granted transactional immunity 
for that murder required evidentiary hearing); United States v. Miranda, 936 F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Fla. 
1996) (finding attorney's representation of both defendant and witness who had earlier pled guilty to 
drug trafficking and money laundering and would testify for government at defendant's money-
laundering trial was impermissible absent consent of witness); see also United States v. McClelland, 
223 F. App’x 742 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding right to conflict-free counsel was violated when defense 
counsel identified a potential defense witness, took her on as a client, and told defendant that the court 
would not let potential witness testify). 
182. See United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding fraud defense counsel's prior 
representation of prosecutor on drunk-driving charges did not prove prejudicial conflict of interest, 
where conflict did not affect counsel's performance); Davis v. State, 897 So. 2d 960 (Miss. 2004) 
(finding defense counsel was not acting under conflict of interest in capital murder trial by having 
previously represented prosecutor in prosecutor's divorce proceedings; defendant had been informed of 
the representation and had voiced no objection, and there was no showing that counsel acted with less 
than full loyalty to defendant or that defendant suffered any prejudice from counsel's representation). 
183. Cases involving defense counsel who were allied with the State in some other case vary 
widely, ranging from instances where counsel prosecuted the defendant on other charges, see State v. 
Almanza, 910 P.2d 934 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (denying motion of defense counsel to withdraw after 
counsel discovered that his firm was prosecuting defendant in municipal court for traffic offenses and 
was erroneous), to cases where some counsel had been part of the prosecutor’s office when criminal 
charges were filed but had no role in the case, see, e.g., Endress v. Coe, 433 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1983) (finding no conflict); Brownlee v. State, 666 So. 2d 91 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (finding fact 
that defense counsel's name was listed as prosecutor on case action summaries that would have been 
used to prove defendant's prior convictions in capital murder prosecution did not create conflict of 
interest where counsel's name appeared on summaries only because he was supervising district attorney 
at that time, not because he had a role in those cases), to cases where defense counsel had previously 
worked for the prosecutor, but not in any case related to the defendant, see, e.g., United States v. Mays, 
77 F.3d 906 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding no conflict where defense counsel had previously served as a 
government informant but role as informant had terminated and was unrelated to defendant’s case). 
184. McConico v. Alabama, 919 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding concurrent representation of 
defendant in murder trial and representation of defendant's wife as beneficiary-claimant under murder 
victim's insurance policy created a conflict, given that the wife’s claim to proceeds required asserting 
that the victim was not the aggressor and the defendant's claim of self-defense required asserting that 
the victim was the aggressor); see also Caban v. United States, 281 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying 
Strickland and granting relief where defense counsel represented defendant's prior counsel in 
disciplinary proceedings, failed to call prior counsel as a witness in the defendant's prosecution for drug 
trafficking and the testimony of prior counsel would have benefitted the defendant). 
185. Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1157 
(1996); People v. Washington, 461 N.E.2d 393, 397 (Ill. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1022. 
186. See, e.g., Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1451 n.7 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e have routinely 
applied both the Cuyler and the Holloway standards to conflict of interest cases which are not multiple 
representation cases, and we do so here.”). 
 












b. Professional or Financial Stake 
Ordinarily, courts are loath to find that the lure of professional 
advancement constitutes a conflict of interest sufficient to trigger Cuyler’s 
relaxed “adverse effect” standard. Courts agree that neither defense 
counsel’s pending employment application at the prosecuting district 
attorney’s office187 nor defense counsel’s campaigning to be elected the 
district attorney during the course of representing a client creates a conflict 
of interest.188 
Not surprisingly, courts also resist finding that the structure of fee 
arrangements or opportunity costs in the form of more lucrative work create 
a conflict of interest.189 The most extreme of these decisions is an Illinois 
 
187. Aase v. Roy, Civ. No. 16-3101, 2017 WL 2791418 (D. Minn. May 1, 2017) (finding no 
conflict under Cuyler where four days before trial and without informing defendant or court, counsel 
applied for a position with the District Attorney’s office, discussed the application with the prosecutor 
over lunch while the jury deliberated, and accepted an offer of employment after guilty verdict but before 
sentencing, where he did not represent defendant); United States v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414 (7th Cir. 
1988); People v. McCrone, 784 N.Y.S.2d 683 (App. Div. 2004) (defense counsel's pending employment 
as assistant district attorney did not pose conflict of interest because defendant's trial was slated to end 
well in advance of counsel's new employment); Smith v. State, 588 So. 2d 561 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) 
(finding defendant did not establish actual conflict of interest on part of defense counsel in capital murder 
prosecution based on counsel's negotiation and acceptance of job with county prosecutor's office while 
representing defendant without informing defendant of alleged conflict, where counsel did not join 
district attorney's office in county in which defendant was being prosecuted and where no specific acts 
of counsel which prejudiced defendant were referenced); see also Jackson v. State, 502 So. 2d 858 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1986) (finding no conflict of interest was created by subsequent employment of defendant's 
former appointed attorney as part-time assistant district attorney where attorney did not take any files 
relating to defendant to district attorney's office, did not reveal any information about case or discuss 
case with attorneys who actively prosecuted it, did not have any prosecutorial responsibility for case, 
and did not divulge any information he had acquired from defendant); Wilkey v. State, 953 P.2d 347 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (finding that the fact that both former public defenders who worked on 
defendant's first murder trial were employed by district attorney during defendant’s retrial did not 
amount to conflict of interest where these attorneys did not appear of record in retrial, and there was no 
evidence of any actual contact between these attorneys and prosecutors of retrial); cf. Atley v. Ault, 191 
F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that, where both prosecutor and defense counsel sought a hearing on 
the potential conflict inherent in defense counsel’s application to the prosecutor’s office, court was 
obliged to hold a hearing). 
188. People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099, 1128 (Cal. 1993) (“Any conflict between an attorney's 
personal interest in obtaining employment and his or her client's interest in loyal and effective 
representation is too attenuated to impute a violation of professional ethics in each such case.”); Jones 
v. Ivory, 334 S.E.2d 666 (Ga. 1985) (finding defendant who knew of his counsel's campaign for district 
attorney, who was aware of his victory one month prior to trial, and who chose to proceed to jury trial 
with counsel was not entitled to new trial based on conflict of interest at time of trial and conviction); 
Coleman v. State, 694 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. 1998) (finding defense attorney’s candidacy for state attorney 
general at time of defendant’s murder trial did not create conflict of interest that violated defendant’s 
right to effective assistance of counsel because attorney stated that he campaigned only at night and on 
weekends and that campaign had no impact on his representation of defendant, and attorney had strategic 
reason for recommending jury waiver). 
189. See, e.g., People v. Winkler, 523 N.E.2d 485, 485 (N.Y. 1988) (“Legal representation in a 
criminal proceeding pursuant to a contingent fee retainer, while unquestionably unethical, does not 












case, in which no conflict of interest was found when the defendant executed 
a note, deed, and mortgage to counsel in return for legal services despite the 
fact that establishing the defendant's capacity to execute these instruments 
was in tension with establishing his unfitness for trial and insanity 
defense.190 The court held that this tension was reconcilable because 
different standards govern the capacity to contract, fitness to stand trial, and 
legal insanity, and that the defendant could therefore have had capacity to 
contract while being unfit to stand trial or being legally insane.191 
Equally surprising (to me, at least) is the treatment of contracts for media 
rights to the defendant’s story. The Beets case, described in the introduction, 
is extreme in that the “conflict” in a colloquial sense was obvious: Had her 
lawyer withdrawn, he could have provided evidence that Beets did not kill 
her husband for the pecuniary gain of an insurance policy (since he could 
testify that she had been unaware of the existence of the policy at the time 
of the homicide), but had he withdrawn, he would have lost the media rights 
to her story.192 It is, however, completely in the mainstream in its holding 
that media rights contracts do not create a conflict of interest.193  
c. Romantic or Sexual Entanglements 
Many of the cases in the category of romantic entanglement are ones that 
would chagrin most members of the bar. Nonetheless, courts have been 
resolute that the romantic or sexual relationships of defense counsel, 
 
1987) (finding fee arrangement by which state agreed to pay defendant's appointed counsel $15,000, but 
left counsel free to negotiate for further compensation if defendant had funds available did not create 
conflict of interest, and neither the agreement nor defendant's failure to supplement fee affected counsel's 
representation); State v. Labonville, 492 A.2d 1376 (N.H. 1985) (finding contingency fee agreement 
improper, but did not prejudice defendant); see also People v. Doolin, 198 P.3d 11, 32, 36 (Cal. 2009) 
(observing that all fee structures provide lawyer with some financial conflict of interest and therefore 
refusing to find conflict for a particular structure). But see Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 
1989) (justifying raising rates based on concerns that low rates of pay for attorneys defending indigents, 
together with arbitrary caps on total amount of fees available for case and delays in payment caused by 
shortfalls in state funding created circumstances in which financial burdens placed on attorneys could 
well create conflict of attorney's interest with that of his client). 
190. People v. Kinion, 435 N.E.2d 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
191. Id. at 536.  
192. See supra notes 15–22 and accompanying text. 
193. Dumond v. State, 743 S.W.2d 779 (Ark. 1998) (holding that defense counsel's entering into 
publication contract with defendant and his wife did not constitute conflict of interest); Hammond v. 
State, 452 S.E.2d 745 (Ga. 1995) (finding that media-rights agreement entered into by murder 
defendant—my client in postconviction proceedings—and his attorney did not create conflict of 
interest); State v. Pitts, 635 A.2d 1356 (N.H. 1993) (holding that contract between defendant, attorney, 
and publishing company transferring defendant's media interests whereby attorney would receive 
payments to be applied to defense of case, which never generated money when media interest waned, 
did not create prejudicial conflict of interest); Stafford v. State, 697 P.2d 165 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) 
(finding contract to serve as trial counsel in exchange for exclusive publication rights of defendant's life 
did not create conflict of interest), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 3537. 












regardless of their nature, do not create Sixth Amendment194 conflicts of 
interest. That defense counsel is married to a prosecutor does not create a 
conflict of interest, even when his spouse prosecuted the defendant in a 
previous case.195 Nor does an “undisclosed, intimate relationship” between 
defense counsel and an assistant district attorney who is the colleague of the 
district attorney prosecuting the case.196 Perhaps these cases are not so 
surprising; certainly the existence of relationships that cross the courtroom 
is not surprising. 
But even with respect to sexual relationships that are completely 
indefensible, courts sometimes refuse to find conflicts of interest. Courts 
disagree as to whether defense counsel’s sexual relationship with the 
defendant’s wife during the trial creates a conflict of interest.197 Nor is the 
defense counsel’s sexual relationship with the defendant herself always 
found to create a conflict.198 One court has found that where counsel herself 
felt a conflict because she had a one-night stand with the prosecutor 
handling her client’s death penalty case, a court should defer to that 
perception, but declined to hold that the relationship itself created a conflict 
cognizable under Cuyler.199  
d. Criminal Charges 
One might imagine numerous ways that an attorney arrested or indicted 
for criminal conduct could compromise representation of a client to 
ingratiate himself to the authorities; at least if the attorney is subsequently 
convicted, it is clear that criminal prohibitions did not deter self-interested 
conduct, so it seems unlikely that an ethical duty to a client would do so. 
 
194. Cf. People v. Jackson, 213 Cal. Rptr. 521, 521–22 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding a potential 
conflict of interest under the California Constitution requiring a new trial where defense counsel had 
undisclosed ongoing dating relationship with prosecutor in defendant’s case). 
195. Abney v. State, 523 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
196. Commonwealth v. Croken, 797 N.E.2d 403, 404 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
197. Compare Hernandez v. State, 750 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (en banc) (finding no 
conflict of interest), with People v. Singer, 275 Cal. Rptr. 911 (1990) (finding conflict of interest). Cf.  
State v. Lasane, 852 A.2d 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (finding sexual encounter between 
defense counsel and the defendant's mother entitled the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea where 
mother was providing family support for young defendant and encouraging a quick disposition of the 
charges). 
198. United States v. Babbitt, 26 M.J. 157, 158 (C.M.A. 1988) (counsel’s adulterous intercourse 
with client on the night before her court martial did not create a conflict of interest). The lone exception 
is United States v. Cain, 59 M.J. 285 (C.A.A.F. 2004), where a military court found that a same-sex 
relationship between counsel and his client created a conflict of interest, but only because it was also 
illegal. 
199. Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001). Interestingly, the Court declined to 
name either attorney, explaining in a footnote its use of pseudonyms as due to the fact that after twenty 












Nonetheless, most courts have found that pending charges, standing alone, 
do not create a conflict of interest.200 “Generally, the criminal conduct of a 
defense counsel creates an actual conflict of interest only when ‘there is a 
danger that the defense attorney would ineffectively represent his client 
because of fear that authorities might become aware of the attorney's own 
misconduct if he undertook effective representation.’”201 Therefore, only 
when defense counsel is suspected of involvement in the same crime with 
which the client is charged have most courts found a conflict of interest,202 
although even here, some have not.203 
 
200. People v. Smith, 581 N.W.2d 654, 660 (Mich. 1998); see also Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 
1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (finding defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by trial 
counsel's arrest for felony drug possession two days before his trial, as there was no evidence that her 
arrest adversely affected her representation), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1036; Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 
487 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel where there 
was no evidence that defense counsel's indictment had any negative impact on the trial), cert. denied sub 
nom. Bowling v. Haeberlin, 534 U.S. 842 (2004); People v. Zambrano, 640 N.E.2d 1334 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1994) (finding no conflict of interest where defense counsel was subject of federal investigation 
concerning corruption in courts because counsel did not have tie to person or entity which would benefit 
from unfavorable verdict for defendant); State v. Hunter, 960 N.E.2d 955, 965 (Ohio 2011) (“[Defense 
counsel's] legal problems relating to pending charges do not establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”); State v. Williams, 556 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam) (“[P]ending 
criminal charges against an attorney are not, standing alone, sufficient . . . to support a charge of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”); State v. Carter, 84 So. 3d 499 (La. 2012) (finding defense counsel 
not ineffective due to conflict of interest although he was facing possible criminal charges at the time of 
defendant's trial); State v. Smith, 476 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 1991).  
201. United States v. Cain, 57 M.J. 733, 738 (C.C.A. 2002) (quoting United States v. Balzano, 
916 F.2d 1273, 1293 (7th Cir. 1990) and citing United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 771–72 (1st 
Cir. 1995)); see also People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183 (Cal. 1998), reh'g denied, (Sept. 23, 1998) and as 
modified, (Sept. 23, 1998) (finding possibility that defense counsel's interest in retaining his license, 
which caused him to ingratiate himself with prosecutor to obtain prosecutor's assistance in securing 
postponement of his suspension until conclusion of trial, was insufficient to establish a violation of 
defendant's right to conflict-free counsel).  
202. State v. Cyrs, 529 A.2d 947 (N.H. 1987); Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 
136 (3d Cir. 1984) (actual conflict occurs when attorney becomes entangled in the criminal conduct 
charged against his client, “has independent personal information regarding the facts underlying his 
client's charges, and faces [himself] potential liability for those charges”); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 
576, 581 (9th Cir. 1988) (actual conflict may exist when attorney is accused of or under investigation 
for crimes similar or related to those of his client “because the potential for diminished effectiveness in 
representation is so great”); see also Briguglio v. United States, 675 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1982) (actual 
conflict where defense counsel was under investigation by the same United States Attorney's office that 
was prosecuting the defendant). 
203. Neal v. State, 669 S.W.2d 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (in the absence of evidence of 
prosecutorial pressure on trial counsel, fact that his attorney had been implicated by a state witness in 
the drug sale was not sufficient basis for reversing conviction); see also State v. Wille, 595 So. 2d 1149 
(La. 1992) (finding no conflict despite fact that defendant's appointed counsel had been convicted of 
felony in widely-publicized case, had received suspended sentence with probation conditioned on 
performance of community service, was appointed to represent defendant to complete his community 
service obligation, and had interest in not further publicizing his felony conviction, creating a 
disincentive to question jurors as to whether their attitude toward defendant would be affected by their 
knowledge that he was being represented by convicted felon).  













Animosity may form the basis of a Cuyler claim, but as discussed above, 
it also may be argued to create a Cronic claim, particularly where it is racial, 
or results in a failure to advocate for the client. In Frazer, the Ninth Circuit 
seemed to rely on both Cronic and Cuyler in holding that racial animosity 
toward one’s client leads to a presumption of prejudice.204  
Some courts have also considered whether other negative feelings 
toward the defendant create a Cuyler claim. In the absence of proof of 
animosity, courts generally do not presume it from personal connection with 
the victim.205 On at least some occasions, specific evidence of animosity has 
led a court to find a conflict of interest. For example, one court held that the 
defendant's allegation that defense counsel exhibited strong antipathy 
toward him, as established by defense counsel’s assertion that the defendant 
"may epitomize the banality of evil," warranted a remand for evidentiary 
hearing on the issue to determine whether counsel's animosity affected his 
ability to act in defendant's best interests.206 Similarly, a Washington state 
court held that a defense attorney who joins the State in an effort to obtain 
a conviction or death sentence labors under a conflict of interest.207 In 
contrast, an Illinois court refused to order an evidentiary hearing regarding 
defendant's allegation that appointed defense counsel had told another 
attorney that the defendant deserved the death penalty because, if proven, 
this would not establish a conflict of interest.208  
Thus, with respect to both the Cronic and Cuyler genera of counsel 
failure, lower court cases reveal considerable disagreement but very little 
discussion of the criteria for determining either constructive absence or 
conflicts of interest. Although Cone has settled one subset of Cronic 
claims—failure to take action—it has provided no guidance for the others, 
and Mickens has done nothing to alleviate the confusion about conflict 
cases. Someone ought to think about these cases in a systematic way, and 
 
204 . See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text. 
205. See, e.g., Ex parte Bell, 511 So. 2d 519, 522–23 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (holding that trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions to withdraw from representing defendant in murder 
prosecution by attorneys who had personally known victim where there was no showing of actual 
ineffectiveness and thus no showing of prejudice). But see State v. Reedy, 352 S.E.2d 158, 161–62 (W. 
Va. 1986) (finding that potential conflict of interest arising from fact that defense counsel was relative 
and friend of victim, which was not revealed to defendant before trial, violated defendant's right to 
effective assistance of counsel). 
206. Commonwealth v. Washington, 880 A.2d 536, 541–46 (Pa. 2005); see also State v. Moody, 
968 P.2d 578 (Ariz. 1998) (finding conflict between defendant charged with first-degree murder and his 
attorney was irreconcilable and required a change of counsel where attorney admitted that he told the 
defendant that he did not care about his case and attorney and defendant almost came to blows). 
207. In re Personal Restraint of Benn, 952 P.2d 116 (Wash. 1998) (en banc). 












Parts III and IV reflect my attempt to do so. I have no neat rule to divide 
bad defense lawyers into truant, torn, and just plain terrible ones, but I 
provide a framework for thinking about the categories.  
I pause here to note that if parsimoniousness were the only criterion, 
Justice Marshall’s approach would win hands down.209 Because he believed 
that the underpinnings of the right to counsel were independent of reliability 
concerns, his approach never would require a showing of prejudice. Instead, 
the only question for Marshall was whether an attorney had failed in the 
discharge of his or her duties; whether the failure came from judicial 
obstruction, ignoring a conflict of interest, incompetence, or indifference 
did not matter. I put aside Marshall's view, at least for the rest of this article 
despite its practical and theoretical appeal, simply because no one currently 
sitting on the Court subscribes to it. I do not think of what follows as a 
departure from the Court’s basic approach (though it parts company on a 
few applications), but as an exploration of the implications of that approach. 
I also put aside a fear that I think undergirded many of the early cases: 
that lawyers facing hopeless cases would search for ways to sabotage those 
cases. If one believed that such behavior would be prevalent, one would 
need to design rules that make sabotage difficult. But at least under the 
current regime, it appears that cases where lawyers will fall on their swords 
for their clients—in disregard of both professional standards of conduct and 
criminal prohibitions against perjury—are very rare. By this generalization 
I do not mean to suggest that no lawyer ever deliberately sabotaged a case 
by egregious misconduct or feigned incompetence, but only that such 
lawyers are so much less of a problem than truant, torn, and terrible lawyers 
that designing rules to thwart the former is foolish. Whether for good or bad, 
unethical criminal defense lawyers do not congregate at the overly-zealous 
end of the spectrum, at least when overzealousness risks their own well-
being. Rather, when faced with allegations of conflicts or incompetence, far 
too many lawyers deny all wrongdoing and incompetence, wrapping 
themselves in the warm mantle of "strategy," even in the most implausible 
of circumstances.210 
 
209. See supra notes 130–32. 
210. It is possible that alteration of the Cronic and Cuyler categories would affect the rates of 
attorney malingering, but I doubt it. The basic preference for law-abiding ethical behavior among 
lawyers is likely to be impervious to such changes, as is the basic predilection for self-protection 
when charged with incompetent or unethical behavior. 












III. THE CRONIC TOUCHSTONE: THE EXERCISE OF LAWYERLY JUDGMENT 
A. Defining Truancy 
Whether we ask why the Sixth Amendment protects the right to the 
assistance of counsel, or ask why the right is so fundamental to the 
American scheme of justice that the right has been incorporated against the 
States through the due process clause, the answer from precedent is the 
same. A defendant is entitled to the assistance of a lawyer because, all too 
often, his lack of knowledge and skill renders him unable to defend 
himself.211 If forced to defend himself, a person might be unable to establish 
his innocence, even if he were innocent;212 conversely, affording defendants 
the right to counsel will decrease the risk of wrongful conviction. At least 
where imprisonment is at stake, the increased risk of error that the absence 
of a lawyer would impose is constitutionally intolerable. It is this purpose 
of the Sixth Amendment—supplying what the layperson lacks—that holds 
the key to the constructive absence of counsel category. 
As early as Powell, the Supreme Court recognized that nominal 
representation by a lawyer did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment command. 
Indeed, without really discussing whether there might be any differences 
between no lawyer at all, and nominal representation under the stark 
circumstances of Powell—eleventh hour, fifty-ninth minute appointment of 
a lawyer—the Court imposed the remedy for total deprivation of counsel: 
automatic reversal.213 Then, between Powell and Cronic, the Court imposed 
automatic reversal on another set of cases, those where the trial court (in 
some way other than tardy appointment of counsel) wrongly interfered with 
the actions counsel would have taken.214 Finally, in Cronic, the Court 
described three exceptions to Strickland that did not require a showing of 
prejudice: 1) a “complete denial of counsel” at a “critical stage of [the 
accused's] trial” occurs;215 2) “counsel entirely fails to subject the 
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing;”216 or 3) the 
 
211. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (“Even the intelligent and educated layman 
has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . . Left without the aid of counsel he may be 
put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant 
to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.” (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932))). 
212. Id. (“[The lay defendant] lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his 
defense, even though he have a perfect one.”). 
213. Powell, 287 U.S. at 56. 
214. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (bar on attorney-client consultation 
during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (bar on summation at bench trial); 
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612–13 (1972) (requirement that defendant be first defense witness); 
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 593–96 (1961) (bar on direct examination of defendant). 













“[c]ircumstances [are of such a] magnitude” as those present in Powell, 
where “the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could 
provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is 
appropriate.”217 
What links these cases? I think it is the absence of an exercise of lawyerly 
judgment. What do I mean by lawyerly judgment? By this, I mean the 
application of the legal knowledge, skills, and experience that make a 
lawyer a lawyer. The absence of lawyerly judgment is obvious when no 
lawyer is present for a critical stage of the trial, but it is equally glaring when 
the trial court interferes with the lawyer’s exercise of his judgment in a 
significant way. Moreover, circumstances can be so extreme—such as those 
in Powell v. Alabama—that although a lawyer appears to be calling the 
shots, his or her judgment cannot rightly be deemed the judgment of a 
lawyer, because the judgment of a lawyer presupposes that he or she can 
apply legal knowledge, skills, and experiences to the advocacy task at hand. 
The absence of lawyerly judgment also explains the third category. When a 
lawyer “entirely fails” to subject the prosecution’s case to adversarial 
testing, it is not that he or she has been prevented from the exercise of 
lawyerly judgment, but that he has not in fact—either through election or 
incapacity—exercised lawyerly judgment. 
Thus, the need for an exercise of lawyerly judgment explains the Court's 
three Cronic categories. But another equally important consideration 
recommends this formulation: Lawyerly judgment is what a layperson 
hopes to get—and needs to get—from a lawyer. A lawyer need not be 
smarter than a client, or more personable, or more articulate. However, 
because he or she has the set of legal skills, knowledge, and experience that 
are helpful in legal proceedings, a client relies upon the lawyer to exercise 
the judgment informed by those skills, that knowledge, and that experience 
to make better decisions than the client would make uninformed by that 
judgment. Put differently, the reason the Sixth Amendment assures the 
provision of professional counsel in serious cases is because the exercise of 
lawyerly judgment makes it less likely that an innocent person will be 
convicted, and less likely that a guilty person will be punished more harshly 
than he or she deserves. Absent the exercise of such judgment, we cannot 
have enough confidence in the verdict to justify criminal penalties.  
Likewise, in the absence of lawyerly judgment, we do not try to assess 
the effect such judgment would have had on a proceeding because the entire 
proceeding would have been different. In contrast with discrete errors in 
investigation, judgment, knowledge of the law, execution of strategy, or the 
like—where a reviewing court can imagine the counterfactual adequate 
 
217. Id. at 659–60. 












performance—without the exercise of lawyerly judgment, such an estimate 
is fanciful. This I think is the essence of a Cronic claim; the lawyer is 
constructively absent (or “truant,” in my shorthand) if there is no person in 
counsel's chair exercising lawyerly judgment. And this is so regardless of 
the reason no lawyerly judgment is exercised. 
B. Applying the “Exercise of Lawyerly Judgment” Standard 
What does the notion of the Cronic category imply for the cases 
described above? For starters, it explains the reaction of most lower courts 
to the status cases; if a purported “lawyer” has never been admitted to a bar, 
or has been disbarred, we cannot count his judgment as “lawyerly.” On the 
other hand, if a lawyer is admitted to a bar in another jurisdiction, that 
should suffice to take the matter out of Cronic. For my money, a disbarred 
lawyer usually is quite a bit more like one never admitted to the bar than 
one admitted in another jurisdiction; disbarment means we no longer trust 
the ex-lawyer to exercise whatever lawyerly judgment he or she might have. 
However, a focus on the exercise of lawyerly judgment might endorse the 
Second Circuit’s response that “technical” defects in bar licensure such as 
failure to pay dues should not create a presumption that no lawyerly 
judgment has been exercised. 
1. Sleeping, Drunk, Drugged, and Mentally Ill Lawyers 
Under an exercise of lawyerly judgment standard, the next category is 
almost as easy. A sleeping lawyer is a truant lawyer; he exercises no 
judgment at all while asleep. A drunk lawyer, or a drugged lawyer, exercises 
some judgment, but contrary to all circuits that have addressed the issue, 
those lawyers also should fall within Cronic. It simply cannot be said that a 
drunk lawyer or a drugged lawyer exercises lawyerly judgment. The 
parameters of lawyerly judgment may encompass a wide range of abilities 
and experience, but it cannot be lawyerly judgment to impair one's decision-
making through the influence of alcohol or drugs. Or at least this is so with 
respect to the lawyer's condition during a critical stage of the proceedings; 
intoxication or drug use on other occasions may impede investigation or 
brief writing, but there are opportunities for correction, and the likelihood 
that the proceeding is unreliable based on drug or alcohol use at non-critical 
stages seems much smaller.  
Whether mental illness causes the disappearance of lawyerly judgment 
depends on the particular mental illness. Surely there are enough neurotic 












the absence of lawyerly judgment. The opposite is true of mental illnesses 
with psychotic features. Thus, the judgment of a schizophrenic lawyer is not 
lawyerly judgment, and though the judgment of a bipolar lawyer may be 
lawyerly judgment most of the time, it is not lawyerly judgment during a 
manic phase, when delusions are common. Of course there are many 
"depressed" lawyers, some of whom are clinically depressed and some of 
whom may feel hopeless about a particular case. Because hopelessness 
about a case (depending on the case) may reflect a lawyerly judgment, a 
court should not deem that attitude, standing alone, a Cronic violation—as 
indeed Cronic itself held. It may be that Pollyannas are better defense 
lawyers, and it may not, but neither unwarranted optimism nor exaggerated 
pessimism can fairly be seen as negating lawyerly judgment. Untreated218 
clinical depression, however, like mania, precludes the exercise of lawyerly 
judgment. 
2. Racially Antagonistic Lawyers 
Racially antagonistic lawyers are harder. Nonetheless, they too fall 
within Cronic. Judgment tainted by conscious racial prejudice is not 
lawyerly judgment. When Curtis Osborne's lawyer referred to him as a 
“n***” and made decisions about how to allocate resources based on 
Osborne's race, those were not lawyerly judgments. Looked at from the 
rationale the Cronic court used to defend the three exceptions it recognized, 
conscious racial animosity toward the defendant too is “so likely to 
prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular 
case is unjustified.” It is true, if we go back in time, that such attitudes were 
not uncommon among lawyers, and perhaps at that time passed for lawyerly 
judgment, but that time has—thankfully—passed.219 
Mayfield—and the panel opinion in Ellis—were wrong to distinguish 
between cases where the client knew of the antagonism during the course 
of the representation and those in which the client did not learn of it until 
later. What the client knew is irrelevant because the Sixth Amendment is 
focused on the lawyer, and whether he has exercised lawyerly judgment, not 
on how the client feels about his lawyer. Ellis involved a lawyer who was 
heard to express racial antagonism about the defendant himself (though not 
 
218. What about a lawyer who is being treated for clinical depression but is still in a clinically 
depressed state? One would hope that a lawyer who is in treatment would be getting—and taking—
advice as to whether his or her condition precludes the exercise of professional judgment. Acting 
contrary to such advice would seem itself to be the failure to exercise lawyerly judgment. 
219. That what counts as lawyerly judgment changes over time is not problematic. Reading the 
law once was enough to make a person a lawyer, but now we require formal study in an accredited law 
school; it would be silly to say that a person whose reading of the law would have sufficed to make him 
a lawyer a century ago is therefore a lawyer today. 












addressed to the defendant), but explicit linkage between the client and 
racial animus is not critical. This is because the nature of racial animus is 
not individual. If a lawyer has expressed racial animus—toward anyone in 
the defendant’s racial group220—a defendant is entitled to a new trial with 
no additional showing. 
Some readers may worry at this point that I stand on a very slippery 
slope, and will next slide toward the view that lawyers whose judgments, 
strategic or otherwise, are in any way influenced by race, are also 
encompassed by Cronic. It cannot be disputed that racial stereotypes, even 
when consciously disavowed, also alter judgment.221 When a laywer 
consciously endorses relevant222 racial stereotypes, the effect on judgment 
is similar.223 It seems to me, however, that the time has not yet come to 
disqualify judgment subconsciously influenced by race; it blinks reality to 
pretend that the judgment of most lawyers (or even most defense lawyers)224 
is in no way influenced by race. Indeed, given the prevalence of racial 
prejudice in the general population, there may be times that strategic 
consideration of race is appropriate.225 Open racial hostility (or the 
endorsement of racially derogatory stereotypes), however, is another matter. 
3. Lawyers Who Fail to Advocate for a Client 
The other hard case is failure to advocate for a client, a case made 
difficult by the Supreme Court’s decision in Cone. Lower courts mostly 
 
220. I do not think that a close temporal connection should be required. Given the enduring nature 
of most racial animosity, I think any expression of racial animus during the period in which a lawyer has 
practiced law ordinarily should suffice. If a lawyer has explicitly—and credibly—renounced racist 
beliefs, that would make a presumption of prejudice inappropriate. 
221. The implicit bias literature is now vast. For an easily accessible summary of this literature, 
see Cheryl Staats et al., State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review, KIRWAN INST. (2017), 
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2017-SOTS-final-draft-02.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/CN4U-KZCK].  
222. Any stereotype about criminality, sexuality, work ethics, violence, or moral worth are 
relevant. Stereotypes about lesser matters, such as musical or athletic ability, while harmful in and of 
themselves, unless linked to more pernicious stereotypes are unlikely to distort the exercise of lawyerly 
judgment in a criminal case; consequently, their endorsement should not lead to automatic reversal. 
223. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), treats racial animus and the expression 
of racial stereotypes as comparable when determining whether their expression by a juror requires the 
trial court to consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial 
guarantee. 
224. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty 
Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539 (2004). 
225. Other readers may worry that the ground slopes another direction. What is to stop the next 
defendant from objecting that her counsel’s sexism or his counsel’s homophobia rendered counsel 
constructively absent? Such cases would be rarer, but if the level of animosity were comparable, it seems 
that once again, the judgment being exercised is not lawyerly judgment, and therefore, a Cronic violation 












agree that the most extreme members of this group of lawyers—those who 
actually advocate for the prosecution with respect to conviction or 
sentence—presumptively prejudice a trial. That much should be obvious; 
there can be no “testing” of the prosecution’s case if the defense endorses 
it.226 Or, looked at from the lens of lawyerly judgment, it is not the judgment 
of a lawyer to advocate for the other side. Almost as clearly, it is not 
lawyerly judgment to express indifference to the outcome, as did Ricky 
Drayton’s lawyer when he said, “You want to sentence him to death? 
O.K.”227  
Then what about Cone? Here I think that the distinction the Court draws, 
in principle is correct: It is not whether counsel fails to test the prosecution’s 
case “at specific points,” but whether it “entirely fails to [test] the 
prosecution’s case.”228 But Justice Stevens’s counter is persuasive: when the 
“points” at which counsel failed to test the prosecution’s case “encompass 
all of counsel’s fundamental duties at a capital sentencing proceeding—
performing a mitigation investigation, putting on available mitigation 
evidence, and making a plea for the defendant’s life after the State has asked 
for death—counsel has failed ‘entirely.’”229 
An approach to constructive absence that focuses on the exercise of 
lawyerly judgment would resolve the dispute about what counts as a “point” 
and what counts as “entirely.” Or, more precisely, it would shift the terms 
of the dispute, thereby rendering it easier to resolve. The exercise of 
lawyerly judgment in a capital case requires, at a minimum, evaluation of 
what actions might save the client’s life and an attempt to take the actions 
most likely to do so; therefore, if counsel has not investigated potential 
mitigation, introduced mitigating evidence, or pleaded for the defendant’s 
life, he has not exercised lawyerly judgment.  
That this is a better conclusion than the one the majority came to in Cone 
by its focus on “entirely” and its insistence that the “distinction is not one 
of degree but of kind” is clear from the Court’s rational in Cronic. Cronic’s 
articulation of the purpose behind the strand of constructive absence focused 
 
226. See, e.g., Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1159 (6th Cir. 1997) (presuming prejudice where 
defense counsel, who was not responding to witness testimony or improper arguments by the prosecutor, 
himself “present[ed] a terrifying image of [the defendant], and thereby aligned himself with the 
prosecution against his own client”); United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991) (prejudice 
presumed where lawyer concedes both elements of the offense and client’s identity as perpetrator); 
Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 629 (10th Cir. 1988) (prejudice presumed where counsel informed 
the judge in a letter, subsequently submitted to the state supreme court hearing Osborn's appeal, that his 
client deserved the death sentence, that the defendant brought it on himself, and later insisted that 
whether it helped his client “wasn't my concern”). 
227. See Harding v. Davis, 878 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1989) (prejudice presumed where counsel 
remained silent throughout most of the trial and failed to object when the court directed a verdict against 
the defendant). 
228. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002). 
229. Id. at 716–17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 












on the failure to test the prosecution’s case is that a lack of such testing 
“makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.”230 But some 
degrees of inaction are so extreme that they also make the adversary process 
presumptively unreliable. If, as in one Tenth Circuit case, counsel waived 
both opening and closing statements, presented no evidence, but made one 
objection to the prosecutor’s closing statement231—doing nothing else in the 
entire sentencing proceeding—surely such a proceeding should be deemed 
presumptively unreliable. Thus, identification of the touchstone of Cronic 
claims as the failure to exercise lawyerly judgment would require a different 
result in Cone, though only because the inaction in Cone is so extreme, 
given the nature of the proceeding. 
IV. THE CUYLER TOUCHSTONE: LOYAL ADVOCACY 
A. Defining Torn Allegiance 
The Sixth Amendment right is not “the right to counsel,” though we often 
refer to it that way, but “the right to the assistance of counsel.” To state the 
obvious, a lawyer, in order to provide the “assistance of counsel,” needs to 
be assisting the client. It is not only lawyerly judgment, but the exercise of 
that judgment in the service of the defendant, that constitutes the Sixth 
Amendment entitlement. I think it is this “assistance” aspect of the Sixth 
Amendment right that is central to the Cuyler conflict of interest category 
of counsel failures. 
In a related line of cases I have not yet described, the Court has made 
clear that the Constitution does not foist lawyers on the unwilling, or even 
foist their preferences on crucial matters upon a defendant who has agreed 
to be represented by counsel. Faretta v. California232 holds that a lay 
defendant, even one without technical legal knowledge, skills, or 
experience, has the right to represent himself, provided that he knowingly 
waives the assistance of counsel. According to the Faretta court, the right 
of self-representation “finds support in the structure of the Sixth 
Amendment, as well as in the English and colonial jurisprudence from 
which the Amendment emerged . . . [and] grants to the accused personally 
the right to make his defense.”233 Concomitantly, while a defendant who 
accepts counsel is bound by the “strategic” decisions of counsel, the right to 
the “assistance of counsel” means that a represented defendant retains the 
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231. Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 2002) (granting relief on guilt phase claims 
and therefore not reaching ineffectiveness in sentencing).  
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right to make decisions concerning “fundamental rights,” including choices 
concerning whether to plead guilty, whether to waive his rights to jury trial, 
whether to be present at trial, whether to testify on his own behalf, or 
whether to concede guilt in the hopes of avoiding the death penalty.234 
This is not to say that a defendant has the right to a lawyer who will do 
anything for him; as Nix v. Whiteside235 made clear, a defendant is not 
entitled to commit perjury, and consequently, not entitled to his lawyer's 
assistance in doing so. Nor is he entitled to his lawyer's assistance in hiding 
evidence, intimidating a witness, bribing a juror, or doing many other things 
that an accused might contemplate, but are the subject of criminal 
prohibition. Put differently, the accused is entitled to the same use of the 
lawyer's skill, judgment, and energy that the lawyer would be entitled to use 
in his or her own defense. 
Glasser, Holloway, Cuyler, and Mickens all recognize that other duties 
or interests may impair the serve-my-client-as-myself assistance required 
by the Sixth Amendment. “The mere physical presence of an attorney does 
not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate's conflicting 
obligations have effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters.”236 Thus, 
Cronic claims focus on the lack of the essence of counsel—the exercise of 
lawyerly judgment—while Cuyler claims focus on the lawyer's decision to 
override that lawyerly judgment due to concerns other than the defendant's 
interests. And just as Cronic claims do not depend on the reason that no 
lawyerly judgment was exercised, Cuyler claims do not depend on the 
reason the lawyerly judgment was overridden. Speaking of joint 
representation cases, the Court in Holloway described “the conflict” in 
terms that would appear to apply to other kinds of conflicting interests: it 
lies “in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, 
not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the 
sentencing process.”237  
Moreover, the Court's rationale for dispensing with a prejudice inquiry 
in joint representation cases seems applicable to other cases in which the 
conflicting interest is not a codefendant: 
[E]ven with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be 
difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the 
attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a 
conflict of interests on an attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in 
plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into 
 
234. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1503–05 (2018). 
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a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, 
unguided speculation.238 
Notice that this view of the heart of conflict of interest claims also 
explains the Court's decision in Cuyler (and Mickens) that it is not just 
conflicts of interest in the abstract, but conflicts that “adversely affect the 
lawyer's performance” that give rise to a presumption of prejudice. The 
Sixth Amendment demands loyal advocacy. It does not, however, demand 
loyalty for its own sake, but because loyal advocacy assures the defendant 
that he is being “assisted” by counsel and assures the rest of us that the 
reliability enhancement that counsel affords is not impeded by the diversion 
of a lawyer's judgment to purposes other than adversarial testing of the 
prosecution's case for guilt and sentence. We can also look at the question 
of what should count as a conflict of interest from the perspective of why 
Strickland's standards should not apply to conflicted counsel, and here too, 
the answer does not suggest a difference between conflicts that arise from 
joint representation and those that arise from other sources of divided 
loyalties. Strickland presumes competence and defers heavily to strategic 
choice when a defendant attempts to rebut that presumption. It is hard to 
imagine, however, why we would defer to strategic choices under 
circumstances where a lawyer's actions reflect a balancing of conflicting 
motivations; that is, in a situation where the lawyer is not loyal to the client. 
If loyal advocacy were accepted as the touchstone of Cuyler claims, 
would this open the door to assertions of endless varieties of purportedly 
"torn" lawyers? In one sense, every lawyer is a torn lawyer. Family priorities 
(or hobbies or health) may compete with time spent on a particular case, and 
time spent on one case may compete with time spent on another case. If 
such conflicts count as Cuyler conflicts, then Strickland collapses into 
Cuyler. But I think they need not do so, and this is because "loyal advocacy" 
cannot mean single-minded pursuit of one client's best interests. As already 
noted, the loyalty due a client does not require a willingness to commit 
crime, nor even “drop everything.” Indeed, even a lawyer representing 
himself or herself might have other demands on his or her time and 
attention. 
Rather, Cuyler claims are claims that a lawyer's judgment is subjected to 
undue influence by other considerations. There is a parallel here to Cronic 
claims; a Cronic claim is not a claim that a lawyer's judgment in a particular 
case was imperfect, for at least over the course of a trial, all lawyers will 
exercise imperfect judgment; rather, a Cronic claim is that what counsel did 
could not be considered exercising lawyerly judgment at all. Likewise, a 
 












lawyer’s time and efforts are always in some sense divided, but a Cuyler 
claim arises when a lawyer is torn—so deeply conflicted at the moment he 
must make strategic decisions that he is not acting as a loyal advocate.  
B. Applying the “Loyal Advocacy” Standard 
1. Sequential Representation and Representation of Parties Other than 
Codefendants 
Focusing on loyal advocacy makes the answer to the question raised at 
the end of Mickens an easy one: No, it does not matter whether concurrent 
or sequential representation is at issue. Nor should it matter whether the 
representation is of two defendants, or a defendant and a witness. 
Representation of any two such parties imposes separate duties of loyalty, 
and where those duties result in an actual conflict, it is enough to show that 
the lawyer's performance was adversely affected. 
Moreover, this focus also drives rejection of any per se rule cordoning 
off multiple representation from all other cases, such as that promulgated 
by the Fifth Circuit. The harder question is, what other classes of cases 
impede loyal exercise of a lawyer's judgment to the same extent as do 
multiple representation cases? 
2. Financial and Professional Stake 
In Beets, one of the media rights contract cases, the Fifth Circuit reasoned 
that Strickland rather than Cuyler should be applied to financial stake cases, 
because, unlike multiple representation cases where the lawyer may be 
“immobilized by conflicting ethical duties among clients, a lawyer who 
represents only one client is obliged to advance the client's best interest 
despite his own interest or desires.”239 This is true, but beside the point if 
the touchstone is loyal advocacy. A touchstone of loyal advocacy requires 
that the first question be whether lawyers will choose to advance the client’s 
interest over their own, and the second, whether they will be able to do so.  
With respect to the first question, it seems clear that where contingency 
fee arrangements or media contracts are involved, to assume that lawyers 
will put aside their own interests blinks the facts. Lawyers in such situations 
have already elected to put their own financial interests over the commands 
of the rules of professional conduct, which clearly forbid both 
“contingen[cy] fee[s] for representing a defendant in a criminal case”240 and 
“agreement[s prior to the conclusion of representation] giving the lawyer 
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literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on 
information relating to the representation.”241 I am not arguing that a conflict 
exists because the Rules identify one, although the existence of the Rule 
does suggest that the Bar Association—which has had a committee studying 
professional ethics for a century—believes that there is a substantial risk 
that lawyers will compromise their clients’ interests in such circumstances. 
Nonetheless the Mickens majority is right that the Rules of Professional 
Conduct are not co-extensive with the contours of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee.242 If they were, automatic reversal would follow upon 
establishment of a conflict, but because the Sixth Amendment concern is 
with reliability, adverse effect must also be demonstrated. So the relevance 
of the Rules here is not what they prohibit, but that the lawyers in question 
chose to ignore those rules. I see no persuasive force behind a generalization 
that a lawyer who places his financial interest ahead of binding Rules of 
Professional Conduct will not put those interests above his clients’ welfare.  
Equally important as the likelihood that a lawyer who disobeyed rules 
prohibiting contingency fees or media contracts would deliberately place 
his interest above his clients is the likelihood that his judgment of what is in 
his or her clients’ interest would be involuntarily swayed by his financial 
self-interest. The concept of motivated cognition, also referred to as “hot 
cognition,” posits that being motivated to reach a particular conclusion often 
leads to unconsciously biased reasoning.243 This phenomenon has been 
demonstrated in a variety of contexts, including the formation of beliefs 
about events and other people.244 And most relevant here, it has been 
demonstrated to affect legal judgments.245 
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How do people reach those biased conclusions without realizing that they 
are doing so? Rather than consider all the facts to which they have access in 
a neutral way, people who are motivated to reach a particular conclusion 
conduct a biased search through the information, rules, and beliefs they have 
to help themselves reach the outcome they desire. They can also be creative 
in combining the knowledge they access to construct new beliefs that can 
provide logical support for the desired conclusion.246 
What motivated cognition does not do is enable a decisionmaker to reach 
a completely unreasonable conclusion; this is because motivated 
decisionmakers attempt to be rational and find a justification that would 
persuade a neutral observer.247 Thus, this psychological process operates 
under an illusion of objectivity; people are unaware of the biases driving 
their decisionmaking and may not realize that “in the presence of different 
directional goals . . . they might even be capable of justifying opposite 
conclusions.”248 
The relevance of this phenomenon to lawyers with significant financial 
interests in conflict with the clients they represent is obvious: Even 
assuming that the lawyer is not trying to make strategic decisions based 
upon his financial stake, his estimation of the risks and benefits of various 
strategies will be altered by the presence of the motivation to make a 
decision in line with that stake. Worse yet, those decisions are unlikely to 
be either consciously venal or implausible; therefore, if subjected to analysis 
under Strickland, the lawyer with a financial stake in a particular outcome 
or intermediate decision will—often honestly—report that he made those 
strategic decisions in good faith, and those decisions will not appear patently 
unreasonable.  
Thus, it seems to me that the question should not be whether financial 
stake creates a cognizable conflict of interest, but what degree of financial 
stake is sufficient to do so. All of the special financial arrangements 
forbidden by the rules seem like easy cases, in part because the particular 
lawyer has either had his or her ethical judgment swayed by the incentive, 
deluding himself or herself into believing that there is no ethical barrier, or 
else he or she has deliberately decided against ethical considerations (in 
which case we should have no confidence he would decide for his client 
over his self-interest).  
With respect to the more ordinary financial incentives—such as the 
competition with more lucrative civil cases, or even a fee cap (unless 
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perhaps where that cap is tantamount to ordering significant expenditures 
rather than merely limiting compensation)—I am inclined to say that the 
lawyer is not torn. Unlike the media deal cases, there is no basis for inferring 
a willingness to override professional judgment, or for inferring that the 
incentive is so great as to subconsciously sway judgment. 
The harder question is the professional incentives cases, which, like the 
financial incentives cases, vary a lot in how compelling the incentive is, but, 
unlike the financial incentives cases, cannot be resolved by drawing the line 
at whether the behavior was condemned by ethical rules. Consequently, 
whether the attempt to change sides renders a lawyer torn is not, I think, 
amenable to a simple answer. In part this is because there are so many 
variations, both in terms of the degree of professional advancement (or even 
financial stake) that will come with the sought-after position, and in terms 
of the conduct that is likely to advance that professional stake. Does it matter 
if the salary at the District Attorney’s office is greater, or how much greater? 
Does it matter what the culture at a particular prosecutor’s office is, or what 
kinds of lawyers that office typically hires? Does it matter who the opponent 
in the election is? Because of these variations, answers will depend upon 
specifics, and what is most important, therefore, is that the right question is 
asked: Is there a significant incentive to behave in a way that might warp 
litigation judgment? 
Having said that, I think that an application to the district attorney’s 
office ordinarily does not create a conflict. In large part, this is because it is 
unlikely to be clear what conduct will actually increase the chances of 
obtaining the job, and therefore, the attorney’s judgment is less likely to be 
swayed. On the other hand, I think that running for the office of district 
attorney—or judge—does create a conflict of interest, simply because in 
most jurisdictions, zealous advocacy on the part of a criminal defendant is 
likely to cost votes. And once the lawyer has accepted a job on the other 
side? Sports team analogies come to mind here, but let me offer one closer 
to home: On my faculty, a person can participate in appointment matters 
while “looking,” but once he or she has accepted an offer from another law 
school, it is understood that he or she will not vote anymore.249 Thus, once 
a lawyer has actually committed to another position, his or her 
representation of a defendant gives rise to a Cuyler claim—one that will 
prevail only, of course, if adverse effect also can be demonstrated.250 
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3. Criminal Charges 
If the standard is loyal advocacy, this one should be easy. One can 
imagine a charge so small that it neither permits the conclusion that one 
does not respect the law nor supports an inference that one will have strong 
incentives to please the judge or prosecutor. But if we are talking about a 
felony, the stake in avoiding conviction is at least as likely to motivate 
cognition toward certain strategies as is a contingency fee or a book 
contract, and consequently, at least as likely to impair loyal advocacy. The 
reader who hesitates, attracted to some limitation that will assure that the 
charges are relevant (such as the one commonly imposed that the crime be 
the same) should remember that, as with respect to professional 
advancement—and all species of conflict claims—it is only when the 
defendant can show adverse effect that the conflict will lead to a new trial.  
4. Romantic and Sexual Entanglements 
Here I am not going to deploy empirical evidence, but rely on common 
experience regarding the power of love and sex. The desire to please or woo 
particularly early in a relationship is so ubiquitously human that to imagine 
that legal training inoculates against its influence is silly. The line I would 
draw, however, is a sexual or romantic relationship, not attraction, at least 
in most cases. Sleeping with or dating the enemy (or any member of the 
prosecution team) obviously creates incentives that diverge from the client’s 
best interest. Similarly, sleeping with or dating the judge creates incentives 
against vigorous objections to rulings, or other aggressive challenges to the 
judge’s actions. 
Sleeping with a client also warps judgment and gives the lawyer 
incentives that he or she should not be considering. The professional rules 
have somewhat belatedly recognized the destructive impact of these 
relationships on the lawyer client relationship, though they have done so in 
large part because of the risk that clients may be coerced, or even if not 
coerced, may be psychologically vulnerable. The Cuyler concern, however, 
is not with power, but with the warping of judgment. Does the lawyer want 
to impress the client? Avoid confronting the client with his or her lack of 
candor? Hesitate before delivering bad news or giving unwanted advice? 
True, in some situations, the lawyer’s romantic interest in the client will 
dovetail with the client’s interest in zealous advocacy; but in such cases, 
adverse effect will not be demonstrable.  
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A sexual relationship with a client’s spouse or partner is at least as likely 
to create conflicting motivations, and at least as likely to have unmeasurable 
effects. A dissenting judge in a case where the majority found no conflict 
put it well: 
Sex is at the top of the list of compelling emotional forces. It 
propelled [defense counsel] into a conflict of interest with [his client] 
with the precise effect on his representation being unknown and 
unknowable. Would [counsel], whose character may otherwise be 
sterling, hold back a bit at trial, or change his strategy, in order to 
assure [his client’s] unavailability to his wife—leaving [himself] a 
clear field?251 
Where adverse impact can be demonstrated, such a relationship also 
compels reversal. 
5. Antagonism or Ambivalence—Actual and Presumed 
Some defense lawyers and clients will not like each other. Even more 
often, defense lawyers will not like—or may even abhor—what their clients 
have done. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, the Sixth Amendment 
does not guarantee any particular emotional relationship. And yet, there are 
some relationships so fraught with poison that one cannot imagine loyal 
advocacy. That a client dislikes or distrusts his lawyer does not create a 
conflict; one would imagine that if such feelings arise early in the course of 
representation, it generally would be prudent to reassign the case, but that 
does not mean the Sixth Amendment compels such reassignment. But if the 
lawyer despises the client, and expresses that sentiment to the client,252 or 
describes him to others in extreme terms, such as "epitomiz[ing] the banality 
of evil,"253 then that lawyer is a torn lawyer, and his conflicted feelings 
should be traced to see whether they led to adverse effects on the 
representation. 
It is a small step to recognize that there are also some—though not 
many—situations so likely to produce conflicted feelings that we should not 
demand evidence of those feelings. If the Sixth Amendment demands loyal 
advocacy, we should ask: Is it just too much to expect a lawyer not to be 
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conflicted when his friend was the defendant’s victim? Put differently, we 
should expect lawyers to be human beings, and expecting loyal advocacy in 
representing someone who is accused of violently assaulting or murdering 
a friend or relative is pretending that lawyers are not human. Lawyers may 
feel grief or anger or something inchoate—but it is quite likely that whatever 
they feel will compromise their loyalty. Lawyers who request permission to 
withdraw under such circumstances should be permitted to do so, and when 
lawyers fail to reveal a close relationship to the victim, a conflict should be 
presumed.  
This leaves, I think, only Mickens, which is less obvious. While it is true 
that representation of a client is not the same as a close personal relationship, 
for most lawyers, the attorney-client relationship is one that produces at least 
loyalty, and often affection. When a lawyer has represented someone who 
later becomes the victim of a nonviolent crime, it is reasonable to assume 
(unless the lawyer protests the assignment on that basis), that the prior 
representation does not create a conflict of interest. But I think Justice 
Stevens had it right: We should “presume that the lawyer for the victim of 
a brutal homicide is incapable of establishing the kind of relationship with 
the defendant that is essential to effective representation.”254 In fact, we 
should presume that the lawyer for the victim of any violent crime is a torn 
lawyer. Not to do so denigrates the right to loyal advocacy—and the 
humanity of the lawyer. 
CONCLUSION  
I hope this article has at least convinced the reader that it is time to 
rethink the categories of counsel failure. In deciding whether to require a 
showing of a “reasonable likelihood of a different result,” or an “adverse 
effect,” or simply to presume prejudice, we need to focus on the purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment promise of the right to the “assistance of counsel” 
rather than on arbitrary categories untethered to those purposes. I think a 
focus on those purposes points toward lawyerly judgment and loyalty. 
When loyalty has been significantly compromised—for whatever reason—
a defendant should receive a new trial if he can show that the compromised 
loyalty caused any adverse effect on his lawyer’s performance. When 
lawyerly judgment has not been exercised—for whatever reason—a new 
trial should be automatic. 
I remember here my client Ricky Drayton, executed by the State of South 
Carolina, my clients Emanuel Hammond and Curtis Osborne, executed by 
the State of Georgia, and my colleague John Blume’s client, Betty Lou 
 
254. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 188 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 












Beets, executed by the State of Texas. I trace my interest in the subject of 
this article to the outrageous behavior of their “lawyers.” In each of these 
four cases, the failures of trial counsel were not due to sloth, or ignorance, 
or stupidity, which are travesties enough, but to something more 
fundamental: the lack of lawyerly judgment directed toward saving their 
lives. 
Emanuel and Betty Lou were both, in my view, represented by 
conflicted, badly torn lawyers, both of whom sold their skills—and 
loyalty—for media rights to their client’s stories. Emanuel’s lawyer, who 
had never previously tried a felony, let alone a murder case, should never 
have represented any capital defendant; his judgment of his own capability 
appears to have been twisted by the lure of rights to a blockbuster. Betty 
Lou’s lawyer held onto the media rights that he had negotiated as his fee 
instead of stepping down as her lawyer and testifying that she was unaware 
of the potential for pecuniary gain, and therefore not guilty of capital 
murder—his judgment of the importance of the testimony forfeited by that 
choice was equally warped by self-interest.  
Curtis and Ricky, were, in my view, represented by constructively 
absent—truant—lawyers. When Curtis’s lawyer, speaking to another client, 
said, “That little n*** deserves the chair,” and boasted that he would hire 
no experts for Curtis, he was worse than no lawyer at all. And Ricky’s 
lawyer, who argued to the jurors that Ricky, a man who could not read, 
“could have climbed the ladder of success, but chose not to,” then reassured 
them, “You want to sentence him to death, O.K.”—that “lawyer” too was 
worse than no lawyer at all.  
What those four lawyers did shames them. The affirmances of their 
convictions and death sentences—and their executions—shame us all. It’s 
time to rethink counsel failures, and align the Cronic and Cuyler categories 
with the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. 
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